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The Rise and Fall of Article 2
Robert E. Scott*
INTRODUCTION

In August 13,2001 the National Conference ofCommissioners on
Uniform State Laws voted eighty-nine to fifty-three to reject the
Amendments to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code that had
just been approved in May by the American Law Institute.' The vote
followed a last minute effort by the Article 2 drafting committee to
amend the scope provisions of Article 2 in response to continuing
criticism from representatives of the software and information
industries. Several months later, at the request of the NCCUSL
leadership, amended Article 2 with its revised scope provision was
withdrawn from the agenda of the ALI Council in order to avoid its
certain defeat. In the months that followed, the Article 2 drafting
committee approved a new version that did not amend the basic scope
section of Article 2 but did amend the definition of "goods" to
exclude "information." 2 The Amendments, as revised, were then
approved by NCCUSL at its annual meeting in August 2002. The
Article 2 Amendments thus return yet again to the ALI Council and,
in the event of its approval, to the ALI membership in May 2003. 3
Copyright 2002, by LOUISIANA LAW REviEW.
Lewis F. Powell Professor and Matheson & Morgenthau Distinguished
Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. I am grateful to Ian Ayres,
Marvin Chirelstein, Victor Goldberg, Ed Iacobucci, Avery Katz, Saul Levmore,
Lance Liebman, Alan Schwartz, Elizabeth Scott, Bill Stuntz and George Triantis
for helpful comments on earlier drafts. I also thank the participants at the faculty
workshops at Columbia, Virginia and Yale Law Schools and the LSU Symposium
on Unifying Commercial Law in the 20th Century, March 7-8, 2002.
1. The version of Article 2 voted down by NCCUSL differed from that
approved by the ALI in three respects. Two amendments to the proposed final draft
were adopted on the floor at the ALI meeting. The first eliminated the requirement
of a quantity term in U.C.C. § 2-201 for a record to satisfy the statute of frauds.
The second reinstated language in U.C.C. § 2-718 declaring unreasonably large
liquidated damages agreements void as penalties. At the NCCUSL meeting, the
drafting committee sent to the floor a revised scope provision in place of the
original (unamended) scope language approved by the ALl. In addition, both ofthe
floor actions approved by the ALI membership were reversed.
2. The current proposed Amendments leave intact the basic scope provision
in U.C.C. § 2-102, which states that Article 2 applies to "transactions in goods."
But U.C.C. § 2-103 (formerly U.C.C. § 2-105) now states that "goods... does not
include information. . . . "Information" is not a defined term. The proposed
Official Comment indicates that whether a transaction that includes both goods and
information is covered in whole or in part by Article 2 is "up to the courts to
determine."
3. In addition to deciding whether to approve the exclusion of"information"
*
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This most recent series of events follows a concerted effort by the
ALl and NCCUSL over the past several years to remove controversial
proposals from the Article 2 revision process so as to ensure approval
by both bodies and ultimate adoption by the states.4 In the process of
downsizing the "revisions" to "amendments," the reporter and
associate reporter of the original Article 2 drafting committee, who
had worked on the project for over a decade, resigned in protest.5 The
effort to sanitize the Article 2 revisions developed because industry
and consumer interests squared off against one another to produce
deadlock on key substantive recommendations. Thus, even if the ALl
and NCCUSL are eventually able to overcome their current
differences, this deadlock over substantive issues represents the
likely end of the fifteen year effort to revise substantially the law of
sales as embodied in Article 2. As a consequence, the statute that Karl
Llewellyn called the "heart and soul" of the Uniform Commercial
Code6 will inevitably become less relevant to the legal regulation of
commercial sales transactions.
The outcome of the Article 2 revision process was predictable.
Indeed, it was predicted.' More than six years ago, Alan Schwartz
and I developed a model for analyzing the nature of the law reform
proposals that are generated by private legislatures such as the ALI
and NCCUSL.' Our analysis led to three predictions, two of which
are relevant to explaining the rise and the fall of Article 2.' The first
1010

from the coverage of Article 2,the ALl will also be asked to approve the changes

to U.C.C. §§ 2-201 and 2-718 that were approved by NCCUSL in August 2001.
See note 2,infra.
4. See Lance Liebman, TheALIand the U.C.C., 52 Hastings L.J. 645, 648-50
(2001); Lance Liebman, ALl Director, Introduction to Website Discussion of
UCC. Article 2 (Sept. 17, 2001) [hereinafter "Liebman, Introduction"].

5. See Richard E. Speidel, Revising U.C.C. Article 2: A View from the

Trenches, 52 Hastings L.J. 607,610-12 (2001) [hereinafter "Speidel, Viewfrom the
Trenches"].
6. Karl Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 Fla. L.

Rev. 367, 378 (1957).
7. This prediction was first made at a roundtable discussion at the AALS

Conference inJanuary, 1994, at which Alan Schwartz and Ipresented adraft of our
paper, The PoliticalEconomy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595

(1995). The Reporter and Associate Reporter of the Article 2 Drafting Committee,
who were in the audience, strongly disputed the accuracy of the prediction. See
Robert E. Scott, Is Article 2 the Best We Can Do?, 52 Hastings L.J. 677, 680-81

(2001).
8.

Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private

Legislatures,143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595,607-37 (1995) [hereinafter Schwartz &Scott,
"PoliticalEconomy"].

9. Inthe article we offered three central claims, two that are relevant to the

Article 2 process and a third that is relevant to understanding Articles 3, 4 and 9.

The third claim isthat where there isonly one interest group that isdominant inthe

law reform process, the private legislature will generate proposals with many bright-
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prediction is consistent with the well documented history of the
drafting and adoption of the original Article 2."0 We predicted that,
in the absence ofinfluence from outside interest groups, these private
legislative bodies will tend to promulgate many vague rules that
delegate substantial discretion to courts. Such rules result not solely
because of their intrinsic merits but because law reform projects of
this sort are dominated by academic reformers with preferences that
are typically far different from those of the median member of the
legislative body. The reformers propose vague rules when they are
unable to get clear, bright-line rules adopted. The original Article 2
project was, in fact, dominated by Karl Llewellyn and a cohort of
fellow reformers, and their political preferences were far from those
of the ALl and NCCUSL members who were considering the U.C.C.
during the 1940s and 1950s." Moreover, the original Article 2 is
famous for its many open-ended, undefined terms. The use of
generalized guides to decision such as custom and usage as well as
vague, open-ended terms (such as reasonableness, good faith, and
unconscionability) necessarily requires subsequent adjudication to
give content to the parties obligations in particular cases.
The current Article 2 revision process, on the other hand, tends to
confirm the second prediction. Unlike the reformer-dominated
processes that characterized the initial drafting and enactment of
Article 2, the recent revision process saw the emergence ofcohesive
and competing interest groups. When interest groups compete, we
predicted that the strong institutional bias ofthese private legislatures
to behave conservatively will be reinforced.' 2 Cohesive interest
groups are able successfully to block the proposals ofthe groups they
oppose but are unable to get their own proposals enacted. The noise
resulting from their competition leads the private legislature to reject
any significant reform in favor of the status quo. Indeed, as the
line, clear rules. These rules will result not from their inherent merits but because
they confine the discretion of courts and thus preserve the victory of the interest
group in the legislative process. See Schwartz & Scott, PoliticalEconomy, supra
note 8, at 637-50.
10. See Schwartz & Scott, PoliticalEconomy, supranote 8, at 645; Allen R.
Kamp, Downtown Code: A History ofthe Uniform CommercialCode 1949-1954,
49 Buffalo L. Rev. 359 (2001) [hereinafter Kamp, "Downtown Code"].
11. See Kamp, Downtown Code, supranote 10, at 392-98. The disparity in
normative views between the academic reformers and the business lawyers who
dominated the ALl and NCCUSL was especially sharp with respect to key issues
such as the appropriate scope of freedom of contract. William Schnader, an
influential lawyer who was the political manager of the Code, was hesitant to
incorporate amendments suggested by the academic reformers because they
represented views so far from the rank and file of the ALl and NCCUSL
membership. See Robert Braucher, A Look at the Work of the Article 9 Review
Committee: A PanelDiscussion,26 Bus. Law. 307 (1970).
12. Schwartz & Scott, PoliticalEconomy, supranote 8, at 648-50.
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efforts to strip Article 2 ofcontroversy over the past three years have
shown, a strong enough status quo bias can induce rejection of even
apparently innocuous proposals.
But, as is often the case, explaining one puzzle only serves to
uncover another. What explains why the initial drafting process of
Article 2 appears to track the first prediction (a reformer-dominated
process that produced many vague and open-ended rules), while the
Article 2 revision process is consistent with the second prediction
(a process dominated by competing interest groups that retains the
status quo)? A key to unlocking this puzzle is another peculiar
artifact ofthe current contretemps over Article 2. Practically no one
who might be thought affected by the process has seemed to care
about the demise of the revisions except the interest group
participants themselves and the hardy band of academic reformers
who were promoting them.' 3 The collapse of efforts to revise "the
heart and soul of the Code" has been greeted with silence
throughout the commercial community.
I suggest that nobody but the participants has seemed to care for
the simple reason that, to the rest of the commercial world, Article
2 has become largely irrelevant. What has happened? There is
evidence that large numbers of commercial parties have opted out
of the sales provisions of the Code. Private arbitration is used to
enforce trade association rules and standard form terms that replace
the default rules of Article 2. The opting out by commercial
interests, extending over many years, would mean that the principal
remaining function of Article 2 is to regulate mass-market sales
transactions. Many of those transactions implicate the licensing of
computer information as well. 4 The interest group competition
thus arises in the clash between the representatives of retail sellers
LO0UISIANA LA W REVIEW

13. Following the defeat of the ALI proposal at the NCCUSL meetings, the
ALI established aweb site to assess reaction by AL members and non-members to

the controversy over the scope ofArticle 2. As one of the final postings noted, "as
the hour approaches for this forum to close, Inote that there are only 25 postings
from 15 ALI members, despite the fact that the forum was extended to allow more
time for comment. This suggests to me that the proposed scope provision either is
not opposed by, or not a topic ofgreat interest to the overwhelming majority ofour
thousands of members." Mary Jo Dively, ALI Members Forum on U.C.C. Article
2 (posted Oct. 26, 2001) available at http://www.ali.org/forum/forum.htm [on file

with author].

14. The immediate, if not ultimate, cause of the split between the ALI and
NCCUSL concerned how best to delineate the proper jurisdiction as between
Article 2, the common law and the proposed Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCITA) over transactions involving combinations ofgoods and
computer programs. The relevant questions, among others, are: Does Article 2

apply to the computer software that is included with a sale of goods? To what
extent does Article 2 apply to so-called "smart goods" where the software is
embedded in the goods themselves? See text accompanying notes 131-136, infra.
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(and licensors) and consumer buyers (and licensees) over the
appropriate scope of market regulation of standard form
contracting.
In this Essay, I examine the political economy of the Article 2
project from its origins to the present. Part I begins with the two
normative questions that have preoccupied contract theorists for more
than a century: What is the proper domain of freedom of contract?
And, within that domain, how should the law complete the gaps in
incomplete contracts? I focus on Llewellyn's unique conception that
these apparently separate questions are, in fact, aspects of a single
institutional objective, an objective that became the normative
foundation for Article 2. In Part II, I analyze the drafting and
enactment process of the original Article 2 and evaluate the success
of the new sales law it introduced, a success attributable in no small
measure to the replacement of archaic vestiges of property law with
efficient contract default rules. In Part HI, I consider the effects ofthe
compromises Llewellyn made to secure the enactment of the Code.
Of particular significance is how the vague terms that invoke the
commercial context (originally intended by Llewellyn as a means of
incorporating ex ante default rules) have been used to challenge the
objective meaning of disputed contracts. For many commercial
parties, exit may have been a cheaper option than lobbying for clearer
and more predictable default rules. But the parties to mass-market
sales transactions remain subject to Article 2, and their
representatives have sought to influence the revision process. Thus,
the focus has shifted from Llewellyn's original goal of prescribing
optimal default rules for commercial contracts to the current debate
over proscribing freedom of contract in mass-market transactions.
The resulting divergence between the interests of producers and those
of consumer buyers, computer information licensees and their
representatives has produced deadlock.
I conclude that the flaws in the Article 2 project were present
from its inception. Given the limits of legal regulation, it is unlikely
that any set of "uniform" rules that are promulgated for adoption in
every state can both efficiently complete the gaps in commercial
contracts as well as optimally police consumer transactions. The
current deadlock is likely to continue as long as the private legislators
who control the U.C.C. drafting process remain determined to pursue
both of these normative objectives in the same statute. One solution
15.

The reference to consumer buyers does not imply that all such end use

buyers are individual purchasers who are "represented" by consumer advocacy
groups such as Consumers Union. To be sure, consumer advocacy groups have
been involved in the process, but, in addition, many of the organized consumer
interests consist oflarge firm licensees ofcomputer information and their lawyers.
See infra note 128.
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would be to turn to the ordinary legislative process to resolve the
normatively controversial distributional issues surrounding the
regulation of standard form contracting. The private legislative
process could then pursue a more modest but achievable goal: the
promulgation of a limited set of efficient sales law default rules. In
short, the uniform laws process works when there is distributional
symmetry (when today's buyer might be tomorrow's seller). On the
other hand, the process deadlocks when it seeks to produce uniform
rules for transactions where the distributional effects are asymmetric
and prices are unlikely to adjust efficiently so as to
6 compensate for a
single group's victory in the legislative process.'
I. LLEWELLYN'S LEGACY: THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF
ARTICLE 2

Karl Llewellyn's contributions to contract theory have been
almost universally misunderstood or ignored. Part ofthe problem lies
with Llewellyn himself and his "gnomic prose."' 7 Llewellyn was an
unusually creative thinker, but he was not a theorist in the classic
sense and he rarely bothered to link his often counter-intuitive ideas
to the intellectual context of his day.' 8 Equally culpable are many of
the scholars who have interpreted Llewellyn's writings over the past

thirty years. A typical, and fundamental, error has been to use his
later jurisprudential writings rather than his earlier work on contract
to analyze and interpret his meaning and intent as the principal drafter

ofArticle 2 ofthe U.C.C..' 9 Alan Schwartz has recently reminded us
16. This conclusion is qualified in the discussion that follows. Deadlock only
results when the distributional effects are both asymmetric and concentrated so as
to stimulate interest group competition. Where the distributional effects are
asymmetric but the gains are concentrated and the losses diffused (as is arguably the
case with respect to Articles 3, 4 and 9), the evidence is that the process "works"
in the sense that uniform enactment can be achieved but only at the cost of
potentially regressive distributional effects. See text accompanying notes 160-162
infra.
17. On the problems of interpreting Llewellyn, see Neil Duxbury, The
Reinvention ofAmerican Legal Realism, 12 Legal Stud. 137 (1992).
18. Others have expressed the same point (perhaps less charitably) by noting
Llewellyn's aversion to citing the work of others even those who obviously
influenced his ideas.
19. See, e.g., Richard Danzig, A Comment on theJurisprudenceofthe Uniform
CommercialCode,27 Stan. L. Rev. 621,624-27 (1975); Kenneth Casebeer, Escape
from Liberalism:Factand Valuein KarlLlewellyn, 1977 Duke L.J. 671; Alexander
M. Meiklejohn, Castlesin the Air: BlanketAssent andthe Revision ofArticle 2, 51
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 599 (1994); William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist
Movement 335-37 (1973) [hereinafter "Twining, Karl Llewellyn"]. I count myself
among the culprits. See Robert E. Scott, The UniformityNorm in CommercialLaw
in The Jurisprudential Foundations ofCorporate and Commercial Law 149, 170-72
(2000) [hereinafter "Scott, UniformityNorm"]; Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theoryand
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that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Llewellyn was not a rule
skeptic and that his contributions to contract theory include a
commitment to ex ante default rules empirically grounded in industry
practice.2" Part of the confusion lies in the fact that Llewellyn's
commitment to filling contractual gaps by providing parties with
more tailored and apt defaults was tempered by his skepticism about
the terms that are generated by "unbalanced" bargains between parties
of unequal bargaining power. Thus, Llewellyn's views on contract
straddle the divide between the debate over default rules and the
debate over freedom ofcontract. It is simply impossible to appreciate
Llewellyn's unique vision, a vision that formed the normative
foundation ofArticle 2, without first understanding the fault lines that
characterize these debates.
A. An Introductionto the Normative Debatesin ContractTheory
In order to assess the degree to which Llewellyn's Article 2
accomplished its objectives, we must first specify what those
objectives are. Article 2 regulates contracts for the sale of goods and,
as such, the statute draws its normative justification from modem
contract theory. The first objective of contract theory is to resolve a
basic sorting problem. Our legal system does not enforce all
promises, not even all those that were seriously intended. Thus, a
normative theory ofcontract must first explain why certain bargained
for promises deserve a presumption of enforceability in the first place.
One response is that the freedom to exchange entitlements
presupposes the freedom to contract for such an exchange. Either
freedom is supported by norms of efficiency and autonomy. Parties
who are denied either freedom to contract or freedom to exchange
entitlements suffer unnecessary constraints on their choices,
constraints that undermine the value of the entitlements themselves.
Thus, the normative claim that supports enforcing bargains is that
voluntary exchange offers individuals more choices than they would
otherwise enjoy and, other things being equal, more choice is better
than less. This norm of expanded choice is so powerful in ordinary
contracts that it justifies not only the state subsidization of an
enforcement mechanism, but also an array of default rules that
delineate the terms of typical bargains, terms that define the
contractual relationship unless the parties design their own
alternatives.2 '
the Justice Paradox, 35 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 329, 341-42 (1993).
20. Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Origins ofContract Theory, in The
Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law 12, 14-17 (2000)
[hereinafter "Schwartz, Origins of Contract Theory"].
21. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101

1016
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Article 2 accepts implicitly the premises of this dominant
bargain theory paradigm. But this paradigm does not fully prescribe
the set of enforceable promises, nor does it prescribe the nature of
the default rules that fill the gaps in incomplete contracts. Thus,
contract theory must grapple with the two questions that lie at the
heart of any justification for the state's coercive enforcement of a
promise against a reluctant promisor. The first, what we might call
the "distributional" question, asks: What is the proper domain of
freedom of contract? The second, "efficiency" question, asks:
Within that domain, what is the appropriate role of the state in
regulating incomplete contracts? Although these two questions
intersect at various points, they are quite separate and distinct. Thus,
the story of Article 2 is, at bottom, the story of how one statutory
scheme has sought to answer both of these questions.
1. PolicingBargains: The Limits of "FreeContract"
While modem contract theory supports a presumption favoring
the enforcement ofbargains, it is also the source ofmany arguments
for prohibiting certain bargains, or at least substantially restricting
them. It might seem strange to look to contract theory to find
reasons for prohibiting certain contracts, but contract law routinely
embraces arguments for limiting itself. Those arguments are oftwo
general types. One class focuses on defects in the bargaining
process. Accepting for the moment the appeal of the expanded
choice norm, the challenge for contract theory is how to preserve its
key elements: a free, informed, and rational choice. Preserving the
core of this idea requires rules that prohibit enforcement where
individual promises were the product of duress, fraud or
unconscionable information deficits, or where the parties lacked the
capacity and judgment to evaluate the risk being exchanged.22
Yale L.J. 1909, 1913-18 (1992) [hereinafter "Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining"].

According to the convergence hypothesis, contract law promotes both autonomy
and social welfare (efficiency) and, therefore, both viewpoints will converge on the
substantive content ofcontract law (although the bases for their recommendations
may not be compatible). Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in The
Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 687 (2002). Michael
Tribelcock considers and then rejects the convergence hypothesis in The Limits of
Freedom of Contract (1993). For a discussion of how both theories might be
combined to produce an overall theory ofcontract, see Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling
Autonomy and Efficiency in ContractLaw: The Vertical IntegrationStrategy, 11
Philosophical Issues 420 (2000). For a limited Rawlsian justification for choosing
efficient rules in particular legal contexts, see Daniel A. Farber, Economic
Efficiency and the Ex Ante Perspective, in The Jurisprudence of Corporate and

Commercial Law 54 (2000).
22. Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining,supra note 21, at 1918.
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A second class ofobjections to enforcement focuses more directly
on the outcome ofcertain bargains. The idea here is that the bargains
themselves are faulty, regardless of whether the bargaining process
was informed and voluntary. Thus, for example, contracts of
enslavement are uncontroversially unenforceable. That familiar
restriction on contractual freedom stems from the notion that people
should not bargain away too much oftheir liberty. 3 Contract also has
a tradition of non enforcement for more systemic reasons, based on
how contractual allocation affects the distribution of certain goods
and services. A classic example is the non-waivability ofwarranties
of habitability. As Dean Kronman has noted, this limitation on
contractual autonomy seems to rest on society's concern about the
distribution of power with respect to fundamental entitlements.24
Housing plausibly falls in that category as do education and health
care, two other fundamental goods that are allocated in part through
non-market mechanisms. In sales law, the salient question has
typically been whether warranty liability for defective goods that
cause personal injuries and/or economic losses should be similarly
non-waivable.
Contract doctrines that focus on process defects or that limit the
domain of free contract require a mechanism by which courts (or
other decision makers) can screen defective contracts from those
engagements that deserve enforcement. As is the case with any legal
regime, two approaches to screening are possible. The first is to draw
bright line rules that are easy to administer in particular cases. The
advantages of this approach, the one most commonly found in the
common law of contract, are relatively low costs ofadjudication and
relatively high transparency of the law to prospective parties. The
disadvantage is that bright line rules are inevitably over and under
inclusive; that is, the underlying justification of a particular rule
argues against allowing some cases that the rule permits, and in favor
of allowing some cases the rule prohibits. In short, rules by nature
cannot be tailored on a case by case basis to conform to the
underlying goals the rules are designed to advance.
The second screening method, the one favored in Article 2, most
famously in the doctrine of unconscionability, is to use vague
standards that allow for case-by-case tailoring. The disadvantages of
this approach are its relatively higher error costs and its relatively
lower degree oftransparency to potential contractors. Error costs will
be higher because answering questions such as "What is a fair term?"
requires much more information than courts can acquire easily in
most contract cases. Thus, it will be more intellectually challenging
23.

Id. at 1928-30.

24. Anthony Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 Yale L.J.
763 (1983).
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for judges or juries to apply such standards in individual cases.
Transparency will be lower because the variance among outcomes of
similar cases will be higher., This not only increases the costs of
transacting, but also increases the Rroblem of unfairness due to
unequal treatment among like cases.
A few moments reflection reveals the inherent difficulty for any
legal regime in choosing the optimal screen for selecting between
enforceable and unenforceable bargains on the grounds of process
deficits or in specifying the domain of permissible bargains. The
value conflict is particularly acute when the question is posed in
terms of categories of suspect transactions beyond the traditional
common law boundaries of fraud, duress, illegality and incapacity.
Thus, for example the question that attracted much of Llewellyn's
interest, and continues to trouble contemporary theorists, is whether
standard form contracting in mass market transactions-the so-called
contract of adhesion-is deserving ofspecial scrutiny over and above
the traditional common law tests for enforceability. Should standard
form contracting between merchants be treated differently than
consumer contracts? Are these categories even meaningful? Does
free choice require assent to particular contract terms or only a
"blanket" assent to terms that are routinely employed in market
transactions? Does the answer to the preceding question depend on
the nature of the market or the nature of the transaction within the
market? What risks cannot be assented to under any conditions?
What are the appropriate limits to paternalism?
Given the difficulty ofreaching consensus on the relevant values,
it seems astonishing at first blush that a private law reform group
drafting a proposed uniform statute would seek to reach technical
rather than political solutions to these freedom ofcontract questions.
But that is precisely what Llewellyn and the drafters of the original
Article 2 sought to do. 6 Before we can evaluate Llewellyn's solution
to the freedom of contract debate, however, we must also consider the
choice between ex ante and ex post perspectives in completing
incomplete contracts.
2. The Gap-FillingFunction ofLegal Rules
Within the domain of free contract, what is the appropriate role
of the state in regulating incomplete contracts? Resolving this
question requires the state first to interpret the signals that the
contracting parties have used, however imperfectly, in allocating
contractual risk. These signals include what the parties wrote (and
25. Robert E. Scott & Jody S. Kraus, Contract Law and Theory 400-01 (3d ed.
2002).
26. Twining, Karl Llewellyn, supranote 19, at 306-07 (1973).
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did not write) and said (and did not say), as well as the context in
which these signals were exchanged. But this interpretive task is not
self-executing. It requires a court (or other decision maker) to select
among (at least) three discrete interpretive strategies. The choice
among these strategies determines the mode of interpretation that is
chosen and, consequently, the shape and content of contract law.27
One strategy is for the state to fill gaps in incomplete contracts
objectively, so as to maximize the ex ante value of the contract
(viewed as of the time of contracting). This strategy is designed to
protect (and even improve) the utility ofthe set ofcontracting signals
for future parties. It requires courts to ignore the contracting parties'
subjective intentions and fill contractual gaps according to
assumptions about the risks that parties similarly situated would
plausibly have agreed to bear at the time the contract was made. This
is the default rule paradigm that has occupied much of the agenda of
the law-and-economics branch of contract theory.28 Default rules
expand parties' choices byproviding standardized and widely suitable
contract terms to cover most risk contingencies. The expanded
choice norm implicitly presumes that the state has a neutral policy
toward individualized agreements, as it has no reason to impose its
default rules on unwilling parties. Viewed ex ante, therefore, atypical
parties lose nothing from the specification of default rules as they
remain free to design alternatives to the state's terms.29
27. For an analysis of each of these strategies and of the consequences of
pursuing any one of them, see Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in
RelationalContract,94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 847,849-53 (2000) [hereinafter "Scott, The
Casefor Formalism"].

28. The argument in favor ofthe default rule strategy runs along the following
lines. In a world where Coasian assumptions of zero transaction costs hold, the
choice among gap-filling default rules is irrelevant because parties can and will
negotiate around suboptimal legal rules. But in a world of transactions costs
anything can happen and, absent substantial data on these costs, one cannot predict
with certainty that any given rule is better than any other rule for any particular set
ofcontracting parties. Surely, though, some rule for allocating common contracting
risks is preferable to no rule. If so, the law ought to adopt the rule that the broadest
number of parties would adopt were transactions costs low enough for parties to
tailor their own rules. A legal rule mirroring what most parties would adopt where
transactions costs are low saves those parties the time, cost and error inherent in
negotiating contract terms and reducing them to writing. The norm of expanded
choice thus justifies this preference for majoritarian default rules. See Robert E.
Scott, The CaseforMarket Damages:Revisiting the Lost ProfitsPuzzle, 57 U. Chi

L. Rev. 1155, 1172-73 (1990) [hereinafter "Scott, The CaseforMarketDamages"].
29. Where transactions costs are too high for parties to fashion their own rule,
it nonetheless may be normatively correct to provide them with the rule that they

most probably would have chosen for themselves at the time ofcontracting had they
been able to bargain. Atypical parties, after all, are not disadvantaged by the
specification ofa "majoritarian" default rule, so long as they remain free to opt out
of the default and design their own tailor-made alternative. This preference for
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The difficulty with the ex ante approach, as Llewellyn noted, was
that it operates at too high a level ofgenerality. Llewellyn was highly
critical in the first instance of those sales law rules that were the
product of abstract concepts such as the location of the "title" in the
goods. But, more to the point, even those defaults that are based on
sensible intuitions about optimal risk allocation are often too general
to be of much use to parties in specific commercial contexts. What
is the point of a default rule strategy based on a majoritarian selection
norm ifthere is no "majority" ofbargainers who would agree ex ante
on any given contract term?
There is a second strategy. Rather than attempt to specify
objective default rules that fill the gaps ex ante, the courts can seek to
fill gaps subjectively from an ex post perspective. That is, they can
fill in the "right" result by imposing an equitable adjustment ofall the
relational and contextual factors that define the parties subjective
"agreement" as it appears at the time of adjudication. This strategy

was advanced by Llewellyn's teacher, Arthur Corbin, who believed
that contractual gaps should be filled so as to effectuate the mental
states of the parties.3" In the contemporary debate, the ex post
perspective is the solution most frequently suggested by the "law-andsociety" branch of contract theorists. Where subjective meaning
cannot be divined, the argument proceeds from the claim that
contracts inevitably create reciprocal "relational" duties. Courts,
employing their informational advantage ex post, should enforce
those duties when the parties cannot agree.3 Efficiency (or fairness)
"majoritarian" default rules does not undermine the selection of default rules
designed to stimulate further negotiation. Certain "information-forcing" default
rules are set, not because they represent the ultimate allocation preferred by most
bargainers, but because they are best suited to inducing one party to share
information with the other. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing
Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 Yale L.J. 1261, 1300
(1980); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial
Contracts,19 J. Legal Stud. 597, 609-10 (1990) [hereinafter Scott, "Relational
Theory"]; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, FillingGaps in Incomplete Contracts.An
Economic Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 Yale L. 87 (1989).
30. See E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning"in theLaw ofContracts,76 Yale L.J.
939, 947 (1967); 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, at 59-61 (1960).
31. Robert A. Hillman, CourtAdjustmentofLong-Term Contracts.An Analysis
UnderModern ContractLaw, 1987 Duke L.J. 1. Under this view, the law explicitly
recognizes that courts adjudicate a contract dispute only after the parties have failed
to specify a contractual solution to the particular problem ex ante and have been
unsuccessful in bargaining their way to a solution ex post. Assume, then, that courts
are in possession of information at the time of adjudication that the parties did not
possess either ex ante or upon renegotiation. Under these conditions, courts should
fill in the gaps ex post and direct an efficient outcome. While under this regime
contracting parties would be unable ex ante to predict the payoffs if certain
contractual risks materialized, they would know that courts would reach an
equitable adjustment that would be efficient as viewed from that vantage point.
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of result thus replaces efficiency of prediction. While many of the
legal realists were attracted to this strategy and to the notion of
subjective intent that supports it, Llewellyn, for reasons that will be
explored later, did not share this ex post view.
A third strategy traces its lineage to the Willistonian approach to
contract interpretation and requires courts to decline to fill gaps
except in clear cases of linguistic ambiguity or where the law has
already provided clear, binary default rules. 2 Willistonian formalism
rested on two basic claims: (1) that contract terms could be
interpreted according to their plain meaning; and (2) that written
terms have priority over unwritten expressions of agreement.33
Unlike Willistonian conceptualism, the contemporary version of this
strategy rests on the functionalist justification that parties often write
incomplete contracts because of problems of hidden or private
information (or because the transaction costs ofspecifying a complete
state contingent contract exceed expected benefits) and that, in such
circumstances, courts are incapable of doing better than the parties
themselves. Under this "neo-formalist" approach, courts are
instructed not to create additional, context-sensitive defaults or to
undertake ex post adjustments. Rather courts are asked to enforce the
(facially unambiguous) express terms ofthe contract literalistically or
"as written," supplemented only by the existing default rules of
contract law. One consequence ofnot filling more contractual gaps
is that courts then must decline to enforce some contracts that are
seriously incomplete, and, in consequence, contracting parties ma y
expend more resources in specifying the terms of their agreements. '
32. For an example of linguistic ambiguity, see note 148 infra. As for the
question of whether the law can usefully create more complex, tailored default
rules, consider the doctrines of perfect tender, mistake, excuse and breach. These

familiar default rules of contract law are all framed in terms of generalized,
categorical, winner-take-all risk allocations. The consistent character of these rules
is that they assign risks on an all or nothing basis. The normative claim underlying
this third strategy is that binary default rules have evolved because they deal with
contracting problems in which there are only a small number of relevant future
states (i.e., either the contract goods are destroyed or they are not). But these
common law defaults do not respond to incomplete contracts where there are an
extremely large number ofpossible and likely future states-i.e., where the market
has price volatility. Because many contracting problems more closely resemble
price uncertainty problems rather than the problem ofloss or destruction ofgoods,
this suggests that there is a hard upper bound on the number of problems that the
law can solve with ex ante defaults.
33. Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary
Acceleration: OfLiewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68
Tex. L. Rev. 169, 187-88 (1989) [hereinafter "Patterson, OfLlewellyn, Wittgenstein
and the Uniform Commercial Code"].

34. For an evaluation of the merits (and demerits) of this approach, see Scott,

The Casefor Formalism, supra note 27, at 871-75.

35. This third approach might be understood as a kind of global information-
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Llewellyn, who was above all a functionalist, also rejected the
conceptualist foundations of formalism. In his view, context was the
single most important determinant to the meaning of contractual
language. But Llewellyn's rejection of formalism and embrace of
context was far different from that of Corbin and the subjectivists.
For Corbin, context was simply an opportunity to uncover the
subjective intent of the contracting parties. Llewellyn viewed context
as a means of implementing fully an objective ex ante default rule
approach. In using context to fill gaps, Llewellyn would not instruct
courts to focus on what the parties subjectively intended their words
to mean in context but rather on what the trade took the words to
mean.3 6 In short, Llewellyn did not object to the notion that parties
should be taken to have accepted, explicitly or implicitly, a set of
default terms; he objected to the manner in which those defaults were
determined. Rather than a set of abstract, generalized defaults, he
argued for defaults that were tailored to the particular commercial
context.
B. Llewellyn's Contributionsto ContractTheory
Most theorists have attempted to evaluate the two core questions
of contract independently. Thus, for example, it is a common
analytical technique to assume conditions of free contracting when
evaluating the merits of the different strategies for filling contractual
forcing default, one that uses the threat of non-enforceability to encourage parties
to specify the solution to certain contingencies themselves. For an argument that

these additional specification costs may well exceed the interpretive error costs of
contextual interpretation, see Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt, In Defense of the
Incorporation Strategy, in The Jurisdictional Foundations of Corporate and

Commercial Law 193 (2000). To be sure, a neo-formalist strategy does not

absolutely preclude courts from contextual interpretation ofa given contract, but it
does require the parties to signal expressly their preference for more subjective
modes of interpretation of the contract terms. The neo-formalist strategy is not as

radical as its seems. It emerges from the classic work of Stewart Macaulay

advancing the claim that flexible social norms, rather than rigid legal rules, govern
commercial contracting behavior. Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations

in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963). Following in
Macaulay's path, I suggested in a later article that contracting parties may have

learned to behave under two sets ofrules: a strict (and formal) set ofrules for legal
enforcement and a more flexible (and contextualized) set of rules for normative

enforcement. The lesson for the courts following his strategy, therefore, is to resist
the temptation to judicialize these social norms on the theory that this effort will
destroy the very informality that makes them so effective in the first instance. Scott,
Relational Theory, supra note 29, at 615.
36. Patterson, OfLlewellyn, Wittgenstein andthe Uniform CommercialCode,
supra note 33, at 189-90; Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl
Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 465, 505-06 (1987)
[hereinafter "Wiseman, The Limits of Vision"].
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gaps. Similarly, analysts who focus on the domain of contracting
assume implicitly that the choice between expanding and contracting
the field of contract is independent of the way in which contractual
gaps should be filled once one is within that domain. But for
Llewellyn these two questions were linked and, moreover, linked in
a way that admitted (at least in his view) of a normatively
uncontroversial solution. Llewellyn's solution purported both to
regulate the domain of free contract in standardized transactions and
also to provide an array of apt and appropriately tailored default rules
superior to the formal and largely abstract rules that had emerged
from the common law process (and had been enshrined in Williston's
Sales Act).
1.Llewellyn's View on Default Rules
Llewellyn's writings on contract, worked out over a fifteen year
period from 1925 to 1940, reveal his continuing effort to resolve
fundamental normative questions of contract theory. Although he
was dismissive of the artificial and abstract character of legal
formalism, he was not in any sense a rule skeptic. Rather, he believed
that most legal reformers and courts took too seriously the legal rules
as reflected in taught legal doctrine. Rather than focusing on the
reasons for court decisions, Llewellyn advocated an approach that
focused on the "working rules" that were reflected in the outcomes of
decided cases." These patterns, in turn, were revealed by a careful
classification ofthe different commercial contexts in which the cases
arose. Searching for the patterns of working rules in specific
commercial contexts led him to the belief that commercial practice
itself was the best source of default rules.
It is commonly believed that Llewellyn advocated a search for the
"immanent" commercial law-moral norms that could be derived
from actual practices. But, as Alan Schwartz has shown, Llewellyn's
contract writings illustrate that Llewellyn believed that custom had
only an epistemological and not a normative relevance, and that
courts can and should infer the efficient rule from the standard
practice." Thus, Llewellyn belongs clearly in the camp ofthose who
advocate completing incomplete contracts with ex ante default rules
37. Llewellyn called himself a "contract theorist," stating that this role required
one to "have as [his] first objective to state accurately and neatly what the courts
have been doing." Karl Llewellyn, The Rule ofLaw in Our Case-Law ofContract,

47 Yale L.J. 1243, 1269 (1938) ("A rule which states accurately the outcome ofthe
cases, seen as cases, incorporates pro tanto such wisdom on the cases as prior
courts have shown, and such similarity of reaction as courts are likely to continue
to show... [The working rule] gives some guidance (to the judge) about wherein
his more personal judgments on such matters may be wisely tempered. Id. at 1257).
38. Schwartz, Origins ofContractTheory supra note 20, at 15-19.
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(which he called "yielding rules") that reflect the deals that typical
parties would make in the circumstances.39 Thus, for example, he
wrote approvingly of the warranty provisions of the Sales Act that:
they seek less to lay down controlling rules than to standardize, on the
basis ofthe most general practice discoverable, the probable meaning
of the acts or words concerned, to most bargainors [sic] concerned.
... And this, in my view, is the sound basic approach to regulative
law about socially unobjectionable transactions which can be
reasonably standardized, and where bargaining power is moderately
balanced or fair dealing is the practice.'
Llewellyn's criticism of
the Sales Act and Willistonian formalism was leveled against their
two major flaws: many of the defaults were inefficient (grounded as
they were in legal doctrine rather than actual practice) and others
operated at too high a level ofgenerality (they were insensitive to the
particular circumstances that might lead parties in some industries to
allocate risks differently than parties in other commercial contexts).
The default rule task, therefore, was to direct courts to fashion both
efficient and tailored defaults. This courts could not do unless and
until they became more acquainted with the commercial context of
the particular dispute. Although Llewellyn was committed to an
empirical foundation for contract rules, his empirical techniques were
at best indirect. Rather than look for business practices directly, he
inferred that practice from the contractual arrangements in litigated
cases. 4 1 Party consent to that arrangement constituted presumptive
evidence that the arrangement was efficient and should become the
legal norm for similar transactions in similar contexts. In this way,
courts could create a menu of tailored default terms that would both
constrain courts decisions in the future and enable commercial parties
to predict outcomes ex ante.42
39. Karl Llewellyn, On Warranty ofQuality, and Society, 36 Colum L. Rev.
699 (1936) ("Common to all [of these cases] js a picture of the way in which
dickers of this kind typically happen, and so of how the parties ought to have
understood what was said and done." Id. at 722 (emphasis added)).
40. Karl Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 159, 197 (1938) [hereinafter "Llewellyn, Through Title"].
41. Twining, Karl Llewellyn, supra note 19, at 313-21.
42. Llewellyn's use of custom as a source ofdefault rules did not commit him
to the use ofcustom as a source ofmeaning in contract disputes. He recognized that
custom was often unhelpful in resolving disputed transactions ("trouble" cases)
because such cases typically arose out of an exogenous shock for which the

custom--created for typical transactions-was not applicable.
In such
circumstances, he was not interested in solving interpretive problems by inferring
what the contracting parties subjectively meant or would have meant (as would
Corbin and the subjectivists ). Nor did he approve ofcourts resolving trouble cases
by imposing an outcome that was fair expost. Rather, he thought such occasions
were opportunities for courts using the resolution of such disputes to impose
efficient solutions, that is, solutions that maximized the ex ante value ofthe contract
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2. Llewellyn andFreedom ofContract
Llewellyn's interest in freedom of contract questions stemmed
from his focus on litigated commercial contracts as a source of
tailored default rules. Before one could infer that the observed
practice or contract term was efficient for that trade or industry, one
would first have to ensure that the terms in question were "bargained
for" and not "dictated" by a stronger party to a weaker one. If the
terms were dictated in a "fiat" contract, then one could not conclude
that the terms were an appropriate source for defaults as they might
only benefit the stronger party. This focus on "balanced" transactions
led naturally to a concern with adhesion
contracts in general and with
43
"lop-sided" contracts in particular.
But Llewellyn's concern with adhesion contracts and with
delineating the domain of free contract was narrowly focused. He
believed that distributional goals played no role incontract: "[M]ost
ofthe Sales field is uncolored as most other law is not by the clash of
class and passion ... because the same parties, and the same types of
party, can tomorrow be occupying each the other end of similar
disputes."' In short, since parties to sales transactions were both
buyers and sellers, there was no reason to believe that one group or
class was distributionally disadvantaged over the other. Thus, the goal
ofsales law was to "solve practical problems by providing rules that
' '
are "practical tools for practical men."45
The focus on balanced transactions as a source of efficient
defaults (rather than as being distributionally fair) led Llewellyn in
general to prefer selective regulation of bargains rather than
mandatory rules. His early views presaged the development of the
doctrine of unconscionability as the key mechanism for regulating
bargains, especially in standard form contracting. Contracts that were
substantively objectionable or "lopsided" should not be enforced
when the bargaining process that produced them was procedurally
defective.46 One exception to this general view was his belief that
warranty disclaimers should be universally unenforceable even where
the "[buyer] has freely agreed thereto" unless the court finds that the
and/or reduced transactions costs for future parties. See Schwartz, Origins of
Contract Theory, supra note 20, at 15-17.
43. Karl Llewellyn, The Effect ofLegal Institutions Upon Economics, 15 Am.

Econ. Rev. 665, 673 (1925).
44. Karl Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 726-27
(1939).
45. Karl Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract Offer and Acceptance , 48
Yale L.J. 779 (1939) [hereinafter "Llewellyn, Our Case-Law"].

46. Karl Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700, 704 (1939) (the goal
is the marking out of the impermissible).
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"clause lies within the reasonable region of self-regulation by
parties."47 This view resulted from his conclusion that such
disclaimers were almost always the product of lopsided contracting.
The conclusion that warranty disclaimers justified a prophylactic rule
against contracting out, in turn, was a function of his empirical
technique of inferring the efficiency of practice from disputed cases.
Warranty disputes arise where the buyer is disappointed with the
quality of goods sold. In that class of transactions, a term allocating
the risk of quality defects to the buyer seems always to deny buyers
the benefit of their bargain. Of course, the question whether such
disclaimers are sometimes an efficient means ofreallocating quality
risks requires as well an analysis of those transactions where the
buyer receives a lower price for the contract goods in return for
assuming a risk that never materializes.
3. Llewellyn's Solution to the Tension between Ex Ante
Defaults and RegulatedBargains
At first blush, Llewellyn's views on the two normative concerns
of contract theory seem to be hopelessly inconsistent. On the one
hand, he held a strong view that parties, not courts, should determine
the terms of their contracts. Parties should be permitted to make "any
agreement they please" because the "animals probably know their
own business better than their keeper [does]-a theory which has not
only charm but virtue, most of the time." On the other hand, he
advocated a theory of regulation that empowered courts to strike
down and/or rewrite contract terms whenever the contract was
"unbalanced." To accommodate both views within a single theory
thus requires a sorting mechanism by which courts can reliably screen
balanced transactions where contracting out is freely permitted from
unbalanced transactions where courts should impose customary terms
that reflect the "reasonable expectations" of the parties.49
For Llewellyn, however, the tension was only a technical and not
a normative problem. He did not view the regulatory function as
representing a clash of interests-as between retail sellers and
consumer buyers-but rather as an exercise in policing outlier sellers,
the "contract-dodger" or "sharper."" Viewed through this lens, the
47. Karl Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37 Colum. L.
Rev. 341, 364-65, n.58 (1937).
48. Id. at 403. See also Llewellyn, Book Review, supra note 46, at 700-01
("Almost any particular clause included in a deal represents the parties' joint
judgment.., and this alone is ground enough for letting it... displace and replace
the general law.")
49. Llewellyn, Book Review, supranote 46, at 704.
50. Karl Llewellyn, What PriceContract? An Essay in Perspective,40 Yale
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regulatory task could be appropriately confined to policing aberrant
transactions without hindering the facilitation ofefficient contracting
for the vast majority ofcontracting parties. In short, for Llewellyn, the
distributional question was derivative of the efficiency question.
Thus, he was willing to privilege the freedom of parties to contract
out of default rules over the regulatory role of courts in policing
unbalanced bargains because he viewed the former as the norm and
the latter as atypical. The regulatory role could be properly confined
because, in Llewellyn's view, the key unit of analysis was the
group-merchants in a particular trade orpractice-and the group can
and would engage in self-policing.'
It is difficult to appreciate in the abstract Llewellyn's "solution"
to the tension between party autonomy to contract out ofdefault rules
and judicial regulation of lopsided bargains. To those committed to
contract as a distributional as well as an allocative mechanism, it may
appear that Llewellyn too readily acquiesced in the creation ofa tool
for policing bargains-the unconscionability doctrine-that was
mostly form and little substance. But for Llewellyn the contemporary
focus on individual rights, on a methodological individualism that is
shared by both sides of the free contract divide, was unfamiliar.
Instead, he was committed to a methodology that focused on the
group as the key unit of analysis. To understand his theory of group
behavior, including the means by which groups could, with the aid of
legal tools, effectively police themselves, one must appreciate his
commitment to the law-and-economics of his day, the institutional
economics of John Commons.52
4. Llewellyn's Law andEconomics
Llewellyn was particularly influenced by the work of John
Commons and the other members of the Institutional school of
economics.53 Commons rejected the focus of economic models on
L.J. 704, 725 n.47, 734 (1931) [hereinafter "Llewellyn, What Price Contract"].
51. Allen R. Kamp, Between-The- WarsSocialThought: KarlLlewellyn,Legal
Realism, and the Uniform CommercialCode in Context, 59 Albany L. Rev. 325,
3 54-65 (1995) [hereinafter "Kamp, Between- The-Wars Social Thought"].
52. For an excellent discussion of the institutionalists and their influence on
academic law, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics
Movement, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 993 (1990).

53. Institutional economics was a label given to the work ofThorstein Veblen,

W.C. Mitchell and John Commons, although their work has few common elements.

G.C. Veljanovski, The New Law and Economics 55 (1982). Institutionalism has
three methodological comments: (1) dissatisfaction with the level of abstraction of
neo-classical economics and with the static nature of orthodox price theory; (2) a
belief in the integration of economics with other social sciences, especially
psychology and sociology; and (3) a belief in detailed quantitative investigations.
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the choices made by rational, utility-maximizing individuals in
markets devoid of institutional structures. After all, most economic
activity involved individuals as members of groups--corporations,
unions, the family, political parties, etc. He sought to include
collective action and institutional analysis within the standard
economic models. Commons principal contribution, therefore, was
to replace the individual with the transaction as the basic unit of
analysis.54 The larger unit,in Commons framework was the "going
concern." According to Commons, "a going concern is a joint
expectation of beneficial bargaining, managerial and rationing
transactions, kept together by workingrules ... and by control ofthe
changeable strategic or limiting factors which are expected to control
others."55
Llewellyn adopted Commons notion of working rules (social
norms in contemporary terminology) and incorporated them as a
"common law" applying not only within an economic unit but
between economic units as well. Since these rules were produced by
the strategic interactions between economic units in society, those
units had an ongoing motivation to police those members ofthe group
who attempted to chisel or otherwise violate the norms. Hence his
commitment to group-policing of contractual chiselers was based on
a theory of the group's self-interest in protecting its place in the
economic order.
Because of the uniquely specialized regulatory role of economic
groups, Llewellyn was unwilling to delegate the primary regulatory
responsibility either to courts or legislatures. In the case of courts,
"the adjustments . . . are and must continue laggard and partial;
inelastic and sometimes mistaken ... [because] judges are neither
industrial workers, business men, nor bankers.... Hence in a vast
body oftheir cases they sit as laymen, groping to solve a controversy
they cannot understand, by a rule whose import they cannot guess."' 6
Legislatures were little better, "though better adapted for general
policy-shaping than courts, [they] are both by size and membership
hampered in doing the legal engineering necessary to their
purposes."" Administrative agencies were a possibility; they offered
"the means of developing experts specialized in their field, ofgetting
quick decisions, and, above all, of getting a wealth of detailed,
specific rulings."5 " But bureaucracy, too, had its limitations.
"Administrative Poo-bahisim,-plaintiff, judge, hangman all in
See M.
54.
55.
56.

Blaug, The Methodology of Economics 678-79 (1980).
John Commons, Law and Economics, 34 Yale L.J. 371-82 (1924).
John Commons, Institutional Economics 8-10 (1934).
Llewellyn, The Effect ofLegal Institutions, supra note 43, at 670.

57. Id. at 671.
58. Id.
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one-is not always happy." 9 Thus, Llewellyn concluded, "it may be
queried whether any sane public regulation of economic activity in
the public interest-whatever that may be-is not largely
accidental."'
The best option for regulating lopsided bargains,
therefore, lay with the groups themselves. 6
In the case of lopsided standardized contracts between members
of different groups, both judicial and legislative intervention is
typical both in its incidents and in its limitations. Outsiders law can
hold inequity somewhat within bounds; but it has little machinery to
effect a cure. The more hopeful movement is the meeting of
organization with organization. There were the conferences between
shippers, carriers, and bankers which led to the uniform railroad bill
oflading. And even more important and extensive is the introduction
of the balanced standardized contract without official stimulus....
The standardized contract with arbitration is thus a shining engine
ofcontrol for any highly specialized going concern within, and partly
independent ofthat greater going concern, the state.62 In sum, the
principle that evolved into Llewellyn's doctrine ofunconscionability
was specifically designed to permit courts to regulate lopsided
contracts by finding and then simply applying group outrage at the
excesses of the "chiseler."
]I.THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARTICLE

2

A. A BriefOverview of the Uniform CommercialCode Project
The story of the Uniform Commercial Code project and
Llewellyn's unique role in the process has been told many times.63
59. Id. at 672.
60. Id.

61. "[P]rivate interests seem to have been the influential factors in law's major
changes in the past. Their working constitutes the striking phase of law's relation
to economics today. Increasingly, associations are forming which adopt their own
rules of action and even settle their own disputes." Id.
62. Id. at 674-75.
63. See Twining, Karl Llewellyn, supra note 19, at 270-301. Recently, Allen
Kamp has published a series of articles that give a fresh and more detailed
perspective on the story. Kamp, Between-the- Wars Social Thought, supra note 51;
Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A Historyofthe Uniform CommercialCode; 1940-49,
51 SMU L. Rev. 275 (1998) [hereinafter "Kamp, Uptown Act"]; Kamp, Downtown
Code, supra note 10. See also Wiseman, The Limits of Vision, supra note 36;
Ingrid M. Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn's Attempt to
Achieve the Good, The True, The Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 Geo L.J.
1141(1985); Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the
Uniform Laws Process:Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78
Minn. L. Rev. 83 (1993) [hereinafter "Patchel, Interest Group Politics"];Schwartz
& Scott, PoliticalEconomy, supra note 8.
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The current that carried the Code project forward was the impetus for
uniformity in commercial law. The rise ofthe modem industrial state
in the late nineteenth century exposed the significant diversity that
existed in the commercial law of various states. The resulting
uncertainty and legal information costs led to proposals for the
enactment of a federal commercial code to govern interstate
commercial transactions.' These proposals in turn stimulated the
formation ofthe National Conference ofCommissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1892.65 Rather than accept federal
intrusions on traditional state authority, the National Conference
proposed to formulate and seek adoption of various uniform laws
governing different aspects of commercial law. Each state was then
encouraged to adopt these uniform statutes. One of those uniform
statutes was the Uniform Sales Act, drafted by Samuel Williston and
adopted by NCCUSL in 1906.66
The Sales Act was never an unqualified success. It received a
mixed reception in the states, and initially was adopted in just over
half the states.67 Moreover, Llewellyn was not alone in criticizing
some of its central features, most significantly its reliance on the
concept of title in the goods to determine risk of loss and other
responsibilities arising out of the sales transaction. The shortcomings
with the Sales Act, and the impediments to its revision, led Llewellyn68
to lobby for the introduction and passage of a Federal Sales Act.
The National Conference reacted to the threat of federalization with
predictable speed. The commissioners lobbied against federal
enactment, began drafting a revised sales act and, perhaps most
significantly, persuaded Karl Llewellyn to assume the principal
revision responsibilities.69
By 1944, the NCCUSL had formed a collaboration with the
American Law Institute ("ALl") and, working in tandem, they
expanded the revised sales act project to include the drafting of a
comprehensive Uniform Commercial Code.70 The decision to
64. See Committee on Commercial Law, Report, 10 ABA Rep. 332-44 (1887);
E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Federalism or Uniformity in Commercial Law, 11 RutgersCam. L.J. 527 (1980).
65. Allison Dunham, A History ofthe National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, 30 Law & Contemp. Probs. 233 (1965).
66. The Sales Act was modeled on the English Sale of Goods Act, 1893. See
Twining, Karl Llewellyn, supra note 19, at 277.
67. Ultimately, the Sales Act was adopted in 34 states.
68. Twining, Karl Llewellyn, supra note 19, at 276-78; See Karl Llewellyn,
The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 Va. L. Rev. 558 (1940).
69. Twining, Karl Llewellyn, supra note 19, at 276-78.
70. The marriage between the ALl and NCCUSL was proposed and arranged
in the 1940s by William Schnader, a prominent attorney who was a vice-president
of the ALl and also served as President of NCCUSL. See Patchel, Interest Group
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produce a code was primarily instrumental. The ALI and NCCUSL
believed that this consolidation of commercial law into a single
statutory scheme would enable them to sell the entire project to the
states on a "take it or leave it" basis thus avoiding the selective
enactment that had occurred with earlier uniform acts.7' While
Llewellyn worked on the Code project for over ten years,
responsibility for drafting key provisions dealing with credit
instruments, bank collections, and secured transactions-Articles 3,
4, and 9-was assigned to others.72 In short order, the drafting
process ofthese articles came to be dominated by representatives of
banking and commercial financing interests.73 Articles 3, 4, and 9
were, in the main, characterized by detailed, precise rules that
allocated commercial risks in ways favorable to the commercial
interests that participated so actively in the drafting process. No
doubt the clarity of the new rules governing asset based financing,
credit instruments and payment systems reduced transactions costs
in the relevant credit markets. But, equally clearly, the rules
favored the interests ofsophisticated repeat players in those markets
over those of occasional participants in financing transactions.74
The Article 2 project, on the other hand, proceeded without the
active participation of external interest groups. The project was
dominated by Llewellyn and his band of academic reformers.75 The
revisions that the academic reformers agreed to during the drafting
process were those that they felt were.necessary to secure the
approval of the far more conservative lawyers and other legal
professionals that dominated the two sponsoring private legislative
bodies. Once Article 2 passed the twin hurdles of approval by the
ALl and NCCUSL, it was essentially carried along by widespread
industry support for the credit and financing articles. Although
Pennsylvania adopted the Code in 1952, it was not until the
comprehensive lobbying following the New York Law Revision
Commission analysis of the Code in 1956 that the professional
community joined forces to ensure the enactment of the Code in
Politics,supra note 63, at 98.
71. William D. Hawkland, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Civil
Codes, 56 La. L. Rev. 233-36 (1995) [hereinafter "Hawkland, UCC and Civil
Codes"].
72. William Prosser was the principal reporter for Article 3 (Commercial
Paper); Fairfax Leary followed by Walter Malcolm were the reporters for Article
4 (Bank Collections); Allison Dunham and Grant Gilmore were the reporters for
Article 9 (Secured Transactions).
73. Kamp, Downtown Code, supra note 10, at 382-88; Gilmore, Confessions
of a Repentant Draftsman, infra note 163, 619-26; Schwartz & Scott, Political
Economy, supra note 8, at 638-45.
74. Robert E. Scott, The PoliticsofArticle 9, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1783, 1815-45
(1994); Schwartz & Scott, PoliticalEconomy, supranote 8, at 643-48.
75. Twining, Karl Llewellyn, supra note 19, at 280-90.
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New York and thereafter
within a decade in every other American
76
state except Louisiana.
B. The Default Rules ofArticle 2
Llewellyn had two principal objections to Willistonian formalism,
as embodied (most irritatingly, in his view) in the Sales Act. First, he
objected to those default rules that were based on artificial doctrinal
conceptions, such as the location of "title" in the goods. These
defaults were "inefficient" in the sense that they did not reflect the
terms of agreement that most parties in the relevant trade would have
made for themselves." Second, the Sales Act default rules applied in
the main to all transactions equally and thus were insufficiently
tailored to the circumstances of particular trades and industries."
Llewellyn's effort to solve the first problem by substituting more
efficient defaults was, in general, a conspicuous success. His attempt
to solve the second problem by creating a mechanism for the
recognition and incorporation of tailored, industry specific defaults
was, in the end, a notable failure.
1. RegulatingContractualBreakdown: Efficient Allocation of
CommercialRisks
Since the focus in recent years has turned to the deficiencies of
Article 2, it is easy to neglect its singular contribution: a series of
efficient default terms for salvaging broken contracts that reduced
76.

Scott, Uniformity Norm, supra note 19, at 155. By 1975, Louisiana had

enacted Articles 1, 3, 4 and 5. Subsequently, Article 9 and portions of Article 2
were enacted as well.
77. Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 40, at 168-70; Karl Llewellyn,
Introduction to Cases and Materials on Sales at VI (1930) ("title is a wholly
unnecessary major premise"). Tellingly, Article 2 begins in U.C.C. § 2-101 with
an initial comment:
The arrangement of the present article is in terms ofcontract for sale and
the various steps ofits performance. The legal consequences are stated as
following directly from the contract and action taken under it without
resorting to the idea of when property or title passed or was to pass as
being the determining factor. The purpose is to avoid making practical
issues between practical men turn upon the location of an intangible
something, the passing of which no man can prove by evidence and to
substitute for such abstractions proof of word and actions of a tangible
character.
U.C.C. § 2-101 (1995).
78. Llewellyn, On OurCase-Law, supra note 45. "A meaningful rule is one
that is defined by "operative fact;" such rules are "understandable and clear about
what action it is which isto be guided, and.., must state clearly how to deal with
cases on the raw facts as they arise." Id. at 12, 28.
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contracting costs for many (if not most) parties to sales transactions.
As noted in Part I, Llewellyn was committed to the idea of filling
contractual gaps with defaults that were ex ante efficient; that is,
defaults that reduced expected contracting costs and thus,
presumably, mimicked the arrangement most commercial parties
would have made for themselves. Under the Sales Act, most risk
allocation questions were resolved by determining who had the title
to the contract goods. The problem was, that while everyone knew
that the party who had the title assumed the relevant risk, no one
knew who had the title. 79 The resulting uncertainty increased
transactions costs and complicated efforts to contract out of the legal
default. Llewellyn's risk of loss rules illustrate his commitment to
legal defaults that reduce transactions costs for contracting parties.
Rather than using artificial conceptions oftitle, Article 2 assigns the
risk of loss in general to the party in control of the goods, on the
(generally sound) intuition that the party in control can best take
precautions to reduce endogenous risk and/or insure against
exogenous risks.8" A similar approach is reflected in the "salvage"
rules of Article 2-rejection, cure, acceptance, and revocation of
acceptance."' These rules were also drafted with the purpose of
reducing contracting costs ex ante by encouraging ex post
adjustments by the party with the comparative advantage in
mitigating the costs of broken contracts.8 2
79. As Llewellyn observed, under the Sales Act, title governed questions of
"risk of loss, action for the price, the applicable law in an interstate transaction, the
place and time for measuring damages, and the power to defeat the other party's
interest, or to replevy, or to reject." Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 40. He
went on to say that "this would be an admirable way to go at it if the Title concept
had been tailored to fit the normal course ofa going or suspended situation during
its flux or suspension. But Title was not thus conceived, nor has its environment
of buyers and sellers had material effect upon it." Id. See Jody S. Kraus,
DecouplingSalesLawfrom theAcceptance-RejectionFulcrum, 104 Yale L.J. 129,
130-32 (1994) [hereinafter "Kraus, DecouplingSales Law"].
80. See U.C.C. § 2-509 (1995). Comment 1to U.C.C. § 2-509 states: "The
underlying theory of these sections on risk of loss is the adoption of the contractual
approach rather than an arbitrary shifting of the risk with the 'property in the
goods."' Comment 3 explains why a merchant seller bears the risk of loss until
actual receipt by a buyer:
The underlying theory of this rule is that a merchant who is to make
physical delivery at his own place continues meanwhile to control the
goods and can be expected to insure his interest in them. The buyer, on
the other hand has no control ofthe goods and it is extremely unlikely that
he will carry insurance of goods not yet in his possession.
Id.
81. See U.C.C. §§ 2-601 through 2-608 (1995).
82. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Sales Law and the Contracting
Process 230-311 (2d ed. 1991); Kraus, DecouplingSales Law, supranote 79, at
135-60.
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Llewellyn was particularly sensitive to the costs of strategic
behavior in the performance of sales contracts. He initially proposed
to substitute a substantial performance standard in place of the
traditional perfect tender rule on the grounds that it was the more
efficient default rule for sales contracts in which the seller's
investment in the transaction exposed it to the risk of opportunism by
the buyer.13 Llewellyn understood, however, that a substantial
performance rule operated as a double edged sword. Requiring a
buyer to accept goods that "substantially conformed" to the contract
reduces the risk of strategic rejections by the buyer, but, in turn, it
exposes the buyer to an opportunistic tender by the seller of
substandard goods.84 His solution to this dilemma reflects his
understanding that legal defaults that impose flexible adjustment on
one party become opportunities for exploitation by the other. The
answer, in his view, lay in the practices and norms of the particular
trade and industry. These norms presumably would have evolved
with sufficient fact-specificity to screen legitimate requests for
adjustment from strategic ones.
To solve this conundrum, therefore, Llewellyn proposed the
establishment of a merchant tribunal-a specialized fact finder that
would measure each party's performance and its responses to the
The
other's performance against established industry norms.8
merchant jury was too radical a proposal, however, and was soon
abandoned in the face ofobjections from more conservative members
of the private legislatures.8 6 In the end, Llewellyn returned to the
83. Section 1I-A of the Revised Uniform Sales Act (Second Draft 1941)
proposed to substitute the standard of mercantile performance for the traditional
sales law standard of perfect tender. See Report and Second Draft, The Revised
Uniform Sales Act (1941) reprintedin 1Uniform Commercial Code Drafts 269,
378-81 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed. 1984). Under this test the buyer was required to
accept performance where the risks and burdens on the buyer were not materially
increased and the goods met the "operating or marketing requirements of the buyer
in the course of his business." Id.
84. For a discussion of the trade-offs between a substantial performance
standard and the perfect tender rule, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The
MitigationPrinciple:Towarda General Theory ofContractualObligation,69 Va.
L. Rev. 967, 995-97, 1009-11 (1983) [hereinafter "Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation
Principle"].
85. The comment on section 1I-A of the Revised Uniform Sales Act (Second
Draft 1941) states: "The proposed policy presupposes the availability of a skilled
and specialized mercantile tribunal to pass on the question offact in case of
dispute. Section 59. There is no question of incurring the uncertainty which would
be involved by letting such a matter go in first instance to an ordinary jury."
Section 59-C(1) provided that the merchant experts were to sit with a court "not as
party representatives, but as a special sworn expert tribunal .to find the true facts."
86. The 1944 draft of the Uniform Revised Sales Act abandoned both the
substantial performance standard for rejection of goods as well as the merchant
tribunal. See Uniform Revised Sales Act, § 91 (Proposed Final Draft 1944),
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perfect tender rule but, by incorporating a cure provision, was able to
create a structure for mutual adjustment that accomplishes many of
the same purposes as a substantial performance rule.87
A final example of efficient defaults for broken contracts is the
remedial scheme introduced in Article 2. Llewellyn began by
focusing on the central question of all disputed contracts: which party
is responsible for salvaging the broken contract? This question, in
turn, requires one to answer a deeper one: given a default rule of
expectation damages equal to the value ofthe broken contract to the
promisee, why would anyone ever breach (except inadvertently)?"8
And yet, we observe advertent breach. There are two possible
explanations for a promisor's decision to breach in the face of an
expectation damages rule. The first is benign: the decision to breach
is a "cry for help"--a request that the contracting partner adjust to the
broken contract by covering (or reselling) on the market and

reprintedin 2 Uniform Commercial Code Drafts 60-61 (Elizabeth Kelly ed. 1984).
The substantial performance standard was objected to by merchants themselves,
who felt that it would expose them to the risk ofsellers tendering non-conforming
goods. See George L. Priest, Breach andRemedy for the TenderofNonconforming
Goods Underthe U.C.C.: An Economic Approach, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 960, 971 n.27
(1975). The merchants tribunal was seen as unworkable, and politically unfeasible.
See National Conference ofCommissioners on Uniform State Laws, Fifty-Second
Annual Conference, at 131 (1942).
87. See Goetz & Scott, The MitigationPrinciple,supranote 84, at 997-1000.
Stating that:
to invoke [the cure provision] properly, one must imagine acase in which
a tender is clearly defective, but the seller nonetheless anticipates that the
buyer will accept the tender as a legitimate readjustment option. These
requirements are satisfied where one can evaluate the deficiency on the
market and correct it with a monetary payment accompanying the tender
....
Granting a seller the right to cure under appropriate conditions
serves two functions. First, section 2-508(2) encourages a buyer
anticipating special losses from non performance to bargain for additional
Second, and perhaps more
protection at the time of contracting ....
importantly, the cure provision restrains opportunistic claims by the buyer.
Unfortunately, it also invites evasion by the seller through the tender of
inadequate substitutes as a 'cure.'
88. The efficient breach hypothesis-which holds that breach enables the
promisor to take advantage of abetter market opportunity while guaranteeing the
promisee the value of its bargain-fails to explain breach in markets where
substitute goods are available. In such acase, the promisor can always "perform"
the contract by covering on the market from a third party and tendering the
substitute "performance" in satisfaction ofthe contract, thereby freeing the promisor
to purse any alternative market opportunity without having to suffer the reputational
consequences of breaching acontract. Thus the question: in amarket where goods
are available in substitution for the contract, what explains why any party would
advertently breach? See Scott & Kraus, Contract Law and Theory, supra note 25,
at 115-17.
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explanation is strategic: breach is motivated by the imperfections in
the judicial system that systematically deny the promisee his
contractual expectancy. Promisors who breach, under this
conception, are able to exploit these imperfections to secure a
favorable settlement of the disputed transaction. The challenge for
contract theory is to predict when the benign scenario is more likely
than the malign one (and vice versa). If the benign story is the more
probable explanation for the promisor's breach, an efficient default
rule would direct courts to award only a damages remedy to the
promisee, thus encouraging the promisee to respond to the cry for

help by acting appropriately on the market. On the other hand, if the
malign scenario is the more probable in the particular case, the rule
should direct the court to grant specific relief to the promisee, thus

trumping the (presumptively) strategic request for assistance.
Under the Article 2 scheme, the determination of which of these
explanations is more likely in any particular setting turns on the
nature ofthe market for substitute goods.9" Where the market is thin,
the implicit assumption is that breach is more likely to be strategic
and the promisee can trump the "cry for help" by demanding either
specific performance or the contract price (as the case may be). 9
89. The assumption here is that the promisor recognizes that it will suffer a loss
on the contract and wishes to enlist the promisee's assistance in minimizing that
loss. The decision to breach, on this view, is made after comparing the promisor's
costs of acting on the market with the (presumably lower) salvage costs of the
promisee (for example, a breaching seller presumably would incur greater costs in
finding a substitute seller from whom to purchase conforming goods to tender to the
buyer than would the buyer, who knows better the market for the goods that it
requires).
90. The Code's remedial scheme implicitly adopts an initial presumption that
breach is a cry for help. Thus, specific performance (or an action for the price) is
an extraordinary remedy. (See U.C.C. §§ 2-703, 2-711(1995)). The promisee buyer
has an option of either covering on the market (U.C.C. § 2-712 (1995)) or
establishing what a cover contract would have cost (U.C.C. § 2-713 (1995)). But,
in either case, as long as there is a market for the goods, the buyer is presumed to
have the comparative advantage in salvaging the broken contract and must act on
the market and subsequently submit a damage claim to the seller. The same
presumption holds for the promisee seller, who must initially choose between resale
(U.C.C. §2-706 (1995)) or proof of what a resale would have yielded on the market
(U.C.C. § 2-708(1) (1995)). In either case, only when the promisee can show that
the market for substitutes is thin does the Code presumption shift toward the malign
story. In such a case, the promisee buyer can secure specific performance (See
U.C.C. § 2-716, cmt. 2 (1995) stating "[i]nability to cover is strong evidence of
'other proper circumstances"'), and the promisee seller can recover the price
(U.C.C. § 2-709(1)(b) (1995) stating "[u]nable after reasonable effort to resell").
91. See U.C.C. §§ 2-716, 2-709(1)(b) (1995). The argument is that, in a thin
market, a promisee is unlikely to enjoy a comparative advantage over the promisor
in covering on the market while, at the same time, the promisee is more vulnerable
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Where there is an available market for the contract goods, however,
the promisee is limited to market damages. This motivates the
promisee to adjust efficiently to the broken contract by salvaging
the broken contract on the market, either by resale or by cover (or,
in the alternative, relying on proof of what such an action on the
market would have yielded).9
The success of Article 2 in substituting efficient defaults that
encourage cost minimizing efforts to salvage broken contracts
should not be underestimated. While the people for whom
Llewellyn was drafting were not sophisticated theorists, they were
sophisticated commercial lawyers who were well aware of the
inefficiencies embedded in the Sales Act. In drafting these
provisions of the Code, as well as a set of efficient defaults that
reduced contract formation costs,9 3 Llewellyn relied upon his long

career as a commercial lawyer. Tearing downthe "wall" oftitle and
drafting sophisticated schemes to facilitate the salvaging ofdisputed
contracts was seen then, as it is now, as a major improvement in the
legal regime, one that would likely ensure the support of the ALI
and NCCUSL members whose approval was necessary for the Code
project to succeed.
2. Regulating Ongoing ContractualRelationships:Flexibility
and TailoredDefaults

Llewellyn's solution for regulating on-going contractual
relationships was even more ambitious than his scheme for
regulating broken contracts. But here he had fewer theoretical
guideposts on which to rely. The economic analysis of relational
contracts was not available to him (and neither were developments
in game theory and decision making under conditions of imperfect
information. As this literature shows, relational contracts are more
difficult for the law to address. In these environments, the parties
to strategic claims that the cover contract was unreasonable since market prices are
more difficult to prove. Scott & Kraus, Contract Law and Theory, supra note 25,
at 990-91.
92. - Scott, The Case for Market Damages, supra note 28, at 1188-1201.
93. The most successful contract formation defaults in Article 2 are (1) the
presumption that parties care more about the fact ofassent than the manner in which
assent is given (U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1995)), and (2) cost minimizing rules for
dealing with open price and quantity contracts. See U.C.C. §§ 2-305, 2-306 (1995).
See also Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles ofRelational Contracts, 67
Va. L. Rev. 1089, 1111-26 (1981). But see Victor P. Goldberg, Discretion in LongTerm Open QuantityContracts: Reining in Good Faith, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 319

(2002) (arguing that the search for "good faith" in interpreting open quantity
contracts often supplants the parties actual agreement with a "wooden, uninformed
reading of the agreement").
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are confronted with problems of uncertainty and complexity that
effectively prevent them, even in theory, from allocating all relevant
risks at the time of contracting. Parties in these situations write
incomplete contracts either because the transactions costs of
predicting the future are prohibitive or because they are trying to
cope with problems of asymmetric information.94
Lacking the conceptual tools to address this problem at the level
of theory, Llewellyn relied on an intuitive sense (derived from his
years as a commercial lawyer) that ongoing contractual relationships
were not efficiently regulated by binary default rules that allocated
risks on an "all or nothing" basis. What Llewellyn saw was similar
to the findings of Stuart Macaulay a generation later.95 Parties
adjusted voluntarily to changed circumstances during the life of the
contract. If an exogenous shock delayed the delivery of goods in a
particular industry, the buyer would accept the late delivery and look
for a price discount on a subsequent transaction. Not only were these
patterns offlexible adjustment ubiquitous, but Llewellyn saw as well
that the parties coped with moral hazard problems in much the same
way: strong social norms in the form of trade practice or even
contract-specific patterns of interaction developed to police
opportunism on both sides of the transaction.
The solution to the dilemma of relational contracting seemed
straightforward. Rather than impose abstract and general rules to
regulate ongoing relationships, the law should simply identify and
incorporate the "working rules" already being used successfully by
the parties themselves. These working rules (or "by-laws" as
Llewellyn also called them) needed the imprimatur of the state for
two reasons. First, the primary culprit in the depressed economic
times of the period was thought to be the contract-dodger or chiseler
who would violate the norms, sell shoddy goods (or fail to pay for
conforming ones) and thus set off a spiraling race to the bottom.
Moreover, the 'jurisdiction" of the "working rules" was uncertain
because they arose from custom and practice. Legal incorporation
was necessary, therefore, in order to resolve "trouble" cases where the
relevant norms were in dispute.
Llewellyn addressed the incorporation objective by reversing the
common law presumption that the parties' writings and the official
majoritarian default rules (the law of contract) are the definitive
elements of the agreement. Rather, Article 2 explicitly invites
incorporation by defining the content ofan agreement to include trade
94. Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, 2 New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics and Law 277 (1997); Scott, The CaseforFormalism,supra note 27,
at 862-66.
95. See Stuart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelationsin Business,28 Am. Soc.
Rev. 555 (1963).
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usage, prior dealings and the parties experiences in forming the
contract. The parol evidence rule under the Code admits inferences
from trade usage even if the express terms of the contract seem

perfectly clear and are apparently "integrated." 96 The invitation to
contextualize the contract in this manner is explicitly embodied in the

Code's definition of agreement,97 and it is amplified in section 1-205
which specifies that course of dealing and usages of trade give

particular meaning to, and qualify terms of, an agreement.9"

It is important to emphasize that Llewellyn did not embrace

commercial context as a method of filling gaps from an ex post
perspective. He was not concerned with a subjective determination
of what the particular parties "really meant" by their agreement.

Rather, as a committed devotee of ex ante default rules, his purpose
was to incorporate rules that would encourage efficient ex ante
contracting. Unfortunately, this point was completely lost on those
who subsequently wrote about and interpreted Llewellyn's statutory
scheme. Since Llewellyn's purpose was to incorporate flexible and
tailored defaults, he required a mechanism by which these local
norms could be identified by courts. That mechanism was the

merchant tribunal.

Linked originally to his effort to substitute

substantial performance in place of perfect tender, the merchant jury
was a panel ofexperts that would find specific facts-such as whether
the behavior of a contracting party was "commercially reasonable."

To avoid questions ofconstitutionality, Llewellyn proposed to retain
the layjury as the final arbiter of the facts, informed by the merchant
96. U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt. 1, 2 (1995) ("This section definitely rejects.., the
requirement that a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence [by course
ofdealing, usage oftrade or by course of performance] is an original determination
by the court that the language used is ambiguous. [Section 2-202(a)] makes
admissible evidence of course ofdealing, usage oftrade and course ofperformance
to explain or supplement the terms of any writing stating the agreement of the
parties in order that the true understanding ofthe parties... may be reached."). See
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits ofExpanded Choice: An Analysis
ofthe InteractionsBetween Express and Implied ContractTerms, 73 Cal. L. Rev.
261, 273-280 (1985) [hereinafter "Goetz & Scott, Expanded Choice"].
97. U.C.C. § 1-201 (3)(1995) defines "agreement" as "the bargain ofthe parties
in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances
including course ofdealing or usage of trade or course ofperformance as provided
in this Act."
98. U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (1995). U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 1 (1995) provides that:
[T]he meaning ofthe agreement is to be determined by the language used
by them and by their action, read and interpreted in the light of
commercial practices and other surrounding circumstances. The measure
and background for interpretation are set by the commercial context,
which may explain and supplement even the language of a formal or final
writing.
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tribunal's judgment about the relevant commercial working rules that
applied to the particular dispute.99

The idea of the merchant tribunal was entirely too radical for the
commercial lawyers who dominated the ALl and the drafting process.
By 1944, Llewellyn had abandoned this key device for discovering

the relevant social norms, while still retaining the architecture of
incorporation, including the injunction that parties conform their
behavior to the supereminent norm of commercial reasonableness.

Viewed in retrospect, eliminating the merchant jury while retaining
the pervasive notion of commercial reasonableness was a drafting
disaster. o
But the failure to provide for the merchant jury is only a symptom
of a larger jurisprudential mistake for which Llewellyn must be held

at least partly responsible. Llewellyn believed that custom and
usages-the by-laws ofcommercial practice-were indistinguishable
from legal rules. Thus, when a court incorporated a relevant norm as

the rule of decision in a contract dispute, this action would not, he

assumed, change either the character or the utility ofthe norm itself.
99. Revised Uniform Sales Act, § 59-D(1) (Second Draft 1941)states "[T]he
special finding of the merchant experts shall be received in evidence, and shall be
sufficient to sustain the evidence." In addition to the issue of substantial
performance, the merchant tribunal was competent to opine on the effect of any
mercantile usage on the terms of a contract, the mercantile reasonableness of any
action by either party and "any other issue which requires for its competent
determination special merchants knowledge rather than general knowledge." See
Revised Uniform Sales Act, § 59(1)(c),(d) (Second Draft 1941).
100. Jim Whitman has noted that the abandonment of the merchant tribunal was
not accompanied by a similar jettisoning of the many issues that the tribunal was to
decide:
But when the commissioners abandoned Section 59, they did not abandon
a host of provisions that assumed the institutional framework of Section
59. Llewellyn's Code retained its deference to "custom," the "law
merchant," "good faith" and "reasonableness." In Llewellyn's Romantic
vocabulary, however, "custom," the "law merchant," "good faith" and
"reasonableness" were not terms of substantive law, but procedural
directives, indications to a court that it should refer its decision to lay
specialists with a feel for commercial law.
James Whitman, Commercial Law andthe American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn 's
GermanSourcesforthe Uniform Commercial Code, 97 Yale L.J. 156, 174 (1987).
Thus, while the idea behind the provisions on commercial reasonableness was that
the merchant juries would, over time, develop default rules defining "reasonable"
behavior in particular contexts, the absence of these juries has caused courts to rely
on intuition. As a result, the norm ofreasonableness has become a major source of
non-uniformity in the application of the Code. Id. at 175. See also, Scott,
Uniformity Norm, supra note 19, at 185 n.68 (In the overwhelming majority of
sampled cases, courts did not attempt to examine evidence of the actual commercial
context to determine commercially reasonable behavior. Rather, they viewed the
commercial reasonableness question as requiring an deductive evaluation based on
Code principles or other intuitions about reasonable behavior.).
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To the contrary, however, there is growing evidence that social norms
and legal rules, while both complements and substitutes, operate in
different domains. These differences support the preferences ofmany
contracting parties to be governed under separate regimes ofbright-line
legal default rules and flexible relational norms that are not legally
enforceable.
There are several reasons why parties may wish to maintain the
distinction between legal rules, enforceable by a third party, and selfenforcing social or relational norms. One important reason is that by
explicitly writing flexibility into the contract as a legal rule the parties
may actually increase the risk of opportunism in the relationship.'0 '
Given the error costs of third-party enforcement, flexible legal
standards are subject to opportunistic exploitation by the promisor. In
other words, any default rule that makes the promisee's duty to
cooperate a condition of the promisor's duty to perform will inevitably
invite both cooperative responses from the promisee andopportunistic
behavior from the promisor. For example, a promisor may be tempted
to claim that the promisee's efforts to cooperate are inadequate thus
justifying a suspension of the return performance.0 2 Since each party
is both a promisee and a promisor, they have reciprocal motivations to
avoid writing contracts with terms that increase contracting costs. It
may be, therefore, that the lesson Llewellyn failed to learn is that
contracting parties have learned to live under two sets ofrules; a stricter
set oflegally enforceable rules and a more flexible set ofself-enforcing
relational norms. Any effort to judicialize these social and relational
norms threatens to destroy the very informality and flexibility that
makes them so effective in the first instance.'0 3
3. Rule Form and Structurein Article 2
Many observers have noted the striking differences in the rule form
between Article 2 and the other substantive articles of the Code.
101. See Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership:
The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited,4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 199,
203 (1988) ("Although writing down binding contract terms may... reduce the
probability of being outside the self-enforcing range [of social and relational

norms], the rigidity of long term contract terms may create a much larger hold-up
potential if events actually place the parties outside the self-enforcing range. To

avoid this rigidity transactors may intentionally leave their contracts incomplete and
thereby give themselves 'an out' if market conditions 'get out of hand."').
102. Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle, supra note 84, at 982-84.
103. Scott, Relational Theory, supra note 29, at 613-15; Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765 (1996) [hereinafter "Bernstein, Merchant
Law"]; Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial
Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 781 (1999) (arguing that incorporating flexible adjustments

as legal rules increases enforcement costs to promisees).
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Article 2 contains a large number of open-ended, vague admonitions
and "muddy" rules. Many sections are little more than statements of
principle that delegate broad discretion to courts to apply them to
specific circumstances. The vague rules of Article 2 stand in sharp
contrast to Llewellyn's frequently expressed preference for precise,
bright line rules in commercial law.'19
There are several obvious explanations for the many vague rules
of Article 2. First, Llewellyn believed that codes differed from
ordinary statutes in their resistance to amendment. A good code,
therefore, facilitates "judicial development (not mere interpretation)"
by stating broad principles and directing courts to reason from them
by analogy.'0 5 Second, Article 2 applies to a wide range of contexts
and parties. The greater the heterogeneity of the parties and the
greater the variety of contexts to which a particular rule applies, the
more convenient it is for a lawmaker to draft rules that are more
open-ended and abstract.0 6 But even beyond the number of vague
rules that one would expect to find in such a broadly applicable
statute, the rule form of Article 2 is a product ofthe political economy
of its enactment. Article 2 was a "reformer dominated" process, one
that was characterized by the virtual absence of pressure, from
external interest groups. The lack of interest group influence in
shaping Article 2 default rules is easy to understand. Unlike, for
example, the rules that govern classes of secured and unsecured
creditors in Article 9, sales law applies equally to commercial buyers
and sellers. Since contracting parties may at any point in time occupy
either role, the new default rules of sales law did not excite the
attention of defined interest groups of sellers or buyers.
The major influence on rule form in such circumstances is the
tension between the interest of the dominant academic reformers (in
this case, Llewellyn and his cohort) in securing the adoption of the
reform proposals, on the one hand, and the normative values reflected
in the proposals themselves, on the other. Under these conditions, the
Schwartz/Scott model of private legislatures predicts that the private
legislature will adopt reform proposals that contain many vague and
muddy rules. These rules will result, not from their intrinsic merits,
but from the compromises that reformer-dominated groups will
accept in order to secure enactment. 7 In this way, Llewellyn's
abandonment of the merchant tribunal left his notions of commercial
104. Schwartz, Origins ofContract Theory, supra note 20, at 22-23.
105. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society II, supra note 47, at 381.
See also Twining, Karl Llewellyn, supra note 19, at 310-13.
106. In short, it is less costly for the drafter of a broadly applicable statute to
instruct parties to behave "reasonably" than to draft clear, sensible rules for a large
number of contexts. Schwartz & Scott, Political Economy, supra note 8, at 618.
107. Schwartz & Scott, Political Economy, supra note 8, at 615-21.
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reasonableness without an anchor. Consider, for example, section 2609. It provides that "when reasonablegrounds for insecurity arise
with respect to the performance of either party the other may in
writing demand adequateassurancesofdue performance and until he
receives such assurances may ifcommerciallyreasonablesuspend his
own performance. . . .(emphasis added)." Generations of law
students have begun their study of the Code by confronting the
facially vacuous nature of that default rule. Without a careful
identification and incorporation of the relevant commercial context,
the provision offers little in the way of a standardized risk allocation
since it has little predictable meaning. For these and other reasons,
the project of crafting flexible, tailored default rules failed in the
implementation. But the vacuous nature ofthe provisions that invite
incorporation nonetheless generated little opposition from the ALI
and NCCUSL membership whose approval was critical to the
enactment of the Code.
C. Article 2 and Freedom of Contract
Llewellyn's views on freedom of contract were reflected in the
early drafts of Article 2. His concern with "unbalanced" transactions
prompted the creation of an obligation of good faith that, for
merchants, imposes a duty to observe reasonable standards of fair
dealing in the trade.' 8 While he viewed standard form contracting as
an efficient adaptation to a modem, mass production economy, he
created the doctrine ofunconscionability to encourage group policing
(under judicial direction) oflopsided contract terms. In addition, the
initial drafts reflected Llewellyn's earlier, specific concerns with
freedom ofcontract in allocating the risks ofdefective products. The
early drafts imposed nonwaivable risks of product defects on sellers
based either on their status as merchants, their specialized knowledge
of the buyer's needs, or on implied guarantees inferred from the
process of describing the goods and/or their attributes.0 9 This
expanded warranty liability was, in turn, extended to remote sellers
regardless of the absence of privity of contract."0
None of the proposals to further narrow the domain of free
contract through mandatory (or "iron") rules survived the drafting
process. Implied warranties were expressly made disclaimable, either
by the incorporation
of custom or by the invocation of conspicuous
"magic words.""' Warranty actions by disappointed buyers were
generally limited to those sellers in privity of contract with the
108. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (2000).

109. See Revised Uniform Sales Act, (Second Draft 1941) §§ 15(2), (6).
110. Id. § 16-B.

111. U.C.C. § 2-316(2), (3)(a), (c) (2000).
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plaintiff."' Finally, in significant places throughout the article-most
notably in the Code's statement of normative purposes-the final
drafts affirmed the principle of freedom of contract (and the
concomitant right to contract out) as a fundamental norm of Article
2.13 To be sure,,Article 2 retains the traditional, common law limits
on bargaining. 1 4 Formal rules, such as the statute of frauds and the
parol evidence rule, are mandatory as are those provisions that
incorporate traditional common law prohibitions on fraud and duress.
But, viewed against the backdrop ofthe fundamental changes in the
nature and form of sales law default rules, the statute is remarkably
muted in its response to the problems of mass market, standardized
contracting.
While this was the effect, it was not the intent. Llewellyn
conceived of the unconscionability provision as the key method of
policing unfair and unbalanced transactions. He wanted courts to
undertake a two step process to identify those contracts that
unconscionably violated group norms. The first step, now commonly
denoted procedural unconscionability, is present 'when one party to
the transaction has market power or when 'one side is more
sophisticated or knowledgeable than the other." 5 While he
understood the value of competition in protecting buyers from unfair
terms, Llewellyn believed that the race to the bottom stimulated by
the "chiseler" would ultimately degrade even competitive markets.
Thus, he saw the use of similar terms by all firms in a market as
strong evidence of market failure. This prima facie evidence of
procedural defects in the transactions would then justify asking
whether the transaction was substantively unconscionable.
In Llewellyn's view, a transaction is substantively unconscionable
if it is "unbalanced" or "lopsided." A lopsided contract imposes too
many risks on one party. The key test ofbalance was the set of default
terms ("yielding rules") that the law has developed over many years.
"Bodies ofyielding rules have grown some balance in their allocation
ofrisks and rights." ' 6 Thus, too much contracting out in transactions
that were procedurally deficient rendered the transaction unbalanced.
But this commitment to policing parties who contract out seems
inconsistent with Llewellyn's other commitment to the specification
112. U.C.C. § 2-318 (Alternative A) (2000).
113. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (2000) provides that "[t]he effect ofprovisions of this
Act may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise provided in this Act ......

Comment 2 states that "[s]ubsection (3) states affirmatively at the outset that
freedom of contract is a principle ofthe Code...".
114. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-103, 2-721 (2000).
115. See Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions, supra note 43, at 671;
Llewellyn, What Price Contract,supra note 50, at 731.
116. Llewellyn, Book Review, supranote 46, at 704.
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ofuseful default rules-that parties could accept or not at their option.
Llewellyn's answer to this tension was instructive:
[T]he policy of leaving yielding rule[s] free to change by
individuated bargain does not involve commitment to apolicy
of allowing displacement of the whole set of yielding rules at
once; and without individuation.... [T]here must be decent
balance in the frame of contracting which is to hold for all
points not individuated by the parties. ' "7
But how to determine how much contractiig out is "too much?"
Once again, the answer to this question could come only from the
commercial context. The merchant group itself had an interest in
policing the "contract-dodger" and they knew when a transaction was
"unconscionably unbalanced." Thus, the merchant tribunal (or some
reasonable substitute method of identifying group norms) was an
essential component in the scheme to harmonize the commitment to
incorporating ex ante default rules with the commitment to policing
unfair bargains.
As famously noted by Arthur Leff, the
unconscionability doctrine, once removed from its anchor in actual
commercial practices, was facially vacuous. ' Indeed, the onlyprima
facie application of unconscionability that survived-the ban on
consequential damages for personal injuries in the case of consumer
goods-served to highlight the freedom to reallocate non-personal
injury risks through standard repair and replacement clauses." 9
In short, Llewellyn's Article 2, once it emerged from the private
legislative process, was entirely congenial to the commercial interests
whose eyes were fixed firmly on the prizes contained in Articles 3, 4,
and 9. Some ofthe drafting compromises-for example, the decision
to abandon the mandatory assignment of defective product risks to
sellers-were no doubt prompted by Llewellyn's instinct to avoid
concrete, bright-line rules that might jeopardize Article 2's approval
by the more conservative members ofthe ALl and NCCUSL. On this
view, it is not surprising that the vague unconscionability standard
was the only surviving mechanism for regulating standard form
contracting. But equally important to the political economy of the
enactment process was the fact that Llewellyn was a product of his
117. Id.
118. Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1967).

119. See U.C.C. §2-719(1)(a), (3) (2000). It is unsurprising, therefore, that the
unconsionability provision did not excite the opposition of merchants, either
individually or collectively. This was especially true once Llewellyn's drafling ally,

the commercial lawyer, Hiram Thomas, persuaded him that the U.C.C. § 2-302
standard for intervention should not be simply "unreasonable" terms but rather
should be limited to those instances that truly "shock[ed] the conscience." Kamp,
Uptown Act, supra note 63, at 306-07.
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time. Our contemporary focus on protecting individual consumer
interests through aggressive judicial policing of contracting behavior
was simply inconsistent with his world-view. Llewellyn's view ofthe
proper domain of free contract reflects the collectivist world-view
that he shared with the other institutionalists. The regulatory
structure ofArticle 2 is not designed to protect one class (consumers)
against another (producers) because Llewellyn simply did not think
in those terms. The doctrine of unconscionability was designed to
assist working groups engaged in commerce to police the "chiselers"
in their midst by testifying to the shocking nature of the terms used in
lopsided contracts. In sum, Llewellyn's regulatory scheme for Article
2 was to empower merchants collectively rather than to empower
consumers individually. 20
D. Summary
The dramatic success of the Code project following its approval
by the ALl and NCCUSL in 1951 is a thoroughly familiar story.
Pennsylvania adopted the Code in 1952 but no states followed suit
until the New York Law Revision Report in 1956 prompted changes
(principally in Articles 3 through 9) that responded to concerns ofthe
commercial interests whose support was critical to adoption by the
states. Thereafter, success was rapid. By 1967, every state except
Louisiana had adopted the Code and, at least in a formal sense,
uniformity in commercial law had been achieved.
Karl Llewellyn's active role in Article 2 and the Code project
ended in the early 1950's, but his achievement in rescuing the default
rules of sales law from the artificialities of the Sales Act was
immediately apparent. There were (and are) measurable efficiency
gains that inhere in a uniform scheme of ex ante efficient default
rules. Prime among these are the reduction in "learning effects"(the
costs involved in learning about how best to use and deploy novel
terms) that result from a common legal language and method of
categorization of legal rules.' 2' This notion of a uniform "filing
system" that permits the storage and retrieval ofkey information was
one ofthe strongest justifications offered by Llewellyn in the 1950's
for the adoption of a uniform sales law. ' As courts began to decide
cases under the Code throughout the latter half ofthe century, specific
court decisions were filed under the broad rubric of Code-defined
120. Kamp, Between-The-Wars Social Thought, supranote 51, at 392-93.
121. See Steven D. Walt, Novelty andthe Risks of Uniform Sales Law, 39 Va.
J. Int'l L. 671 (1999); Michael Klausner, Corporations,Corporate Law, and
Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757, 786-89 (1995).
122. Karl Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. Fla.

L. Rev. 367, 369 (1957).
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categories such as rejection, cure, revocation ofacceptance, etc. This
systematizing of the retrieval of legal rules reduced the information
costs imposed by the jurisdictional diversity that governed the preCode era.
But despite the Code's initial comparative advantage, a similar
movement toward interjurisdictional uniformity evolved in the
common law over the same period. Indeed, the past fifty years have
witnessed a remarkable degree of harmonization of American
commercial common law. The variations in contract law from state
to state today are relatively small and insignificant. The result outside
the Code over the same period of time, therefore, has been
substantive harmony without uniformity. 23 Thus, in one sense, the
benefits of Article 2 have now been internalized in the common law
process, exposing the deficiencies inherent in the statute. Those
deficiencies, in the end, may have contributed to the decision by
many commercial parties to abandon Article 2 and its open-ended
default rules in favor of more concrete, privately devised alternatives.
At the same time, the debate over freedom of contract, especially in
the regulation of standardized contracting, has intensified. Whether
these two forces are primary causal factors in the decline of the
Code's relevance and the ultimate failure of the revision process
remains an open question. But it seems hard to deny that they are
salient contributing factors in explaining the dramatically different
environment that surrounds the private legislative process today.
III. ARTICLE 2 FIFTY YEARS LATER
A. The Article 2 Revision Process
Article 2 needs revision. This uncontested fact has been selfevident for two decades. This is not to say that Article 2 has
functioned inadequately as a framework for cataloguing judicial
decisions in sales contract disputes. Indeed, a number of
contemporary scholars believe that the statute has performed well in
directing courts as to the best means offilling the gas in incomplete
contracts and policing unconscionable bargains.*2 But whatever
123. Scott, Uniformity Norm, supra note 19, at 167-69.
124. The Code's defenders far out number its critics, even among those who are
dismayed by the failure of the current revision process. The comments of Professor
Melvin Eisenberg in the ALl members web site forum sum up this majority view:
"I should add that if the result [of the current deadlock] is no revision of Article 2,
that's not the worst thing in the world. Article 2 works well now, and whatever
serious drafting flaws it had have by and large been fixed up by the courts. Of
course a minor tuneup would probably be desirable, but it's not imperative, and
very little will be lost by sticking with Article 2 as it stands." Melvin Eisenberg,
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one's views on these questions, it is clear that the information
revolution threatens to leave Article 2 in an increasingly small
backwater of commercial transactions. If the statute is to retain its
primacy as a source of legal defaults that both facilitate and regulate
commercial sales transactions, it must be adapted to technological
and economic developments that have created entirely new markets
in information technology. The original scope provision of Article
2---covering all transactions in goods-seems inadequate, even with
its subsequent common law gloss, to answer fundamental
jurisdictional questions." 5 Does or should Article 2 govern
information contracting? If not, what is the domain of Article 2 as
distinct from the domain ofalternative statutory or common law rules
governing software licensing transactions?" 6
ALl Members Forum on U.C.C. Article 2 (posted Oct. 19, 2001) available at
http://www.ali.org/forum/forum.htm [on file with author].
125. U.C.C. §2-102 (2000) provides that "this Article applies to transactions in
goods." Goods, in turn, are defined in U.C.C. § 2-105 (2000) as "all things
movable at the time of identification to the contract." Thus, Article 2 by its terms
declines to resolve the issue of jurisdiction over "mixed" transactions, such as
transactions involving both a sale of goods and the provision of services. Many
courts have settled on two tests to provide more clarity to scope disputes. The
"divisibility" test asks whether the transaction can be separated into its goods and
non-goods components. If so, then Article 2 applies to the portion of the contract
dealing with goods and other relevant state law (typically the common law of
contracts) applies to the non-goods components. Where the goods portion of a
transaction cannot be separated functionally, most courts apply a "predominant
factor" test that asks which component of the mixed transaction-goods or nongoods-predominates. The predominant component determines which legal regime
applies. See, e.g., Valley Farmers' Elevator v. Lindsay Bros. Co. v. Martin Steel
Corp., 398 N.W. 2d 553 (Minn. 1987); but see Elkins Manor Assoc. v. Eleanor
Concrete Works, Inc., 396 S.E. 2d 463 (W.Va. 1990) (declining to use the
predominant factor test because the "test is too subjective to provide any basis for
rational analysis" Id. at 469.).
126. The original scope provision was unchanged in the version of the 2001
Amendments to Article 2 that was adopted by the ALI membership in May 2001.
All attempts to draft a clearer and more definitive scope provision that drew lines
between the coverage of Article 2 and the coverage of other law dealing with
information and software transactions fell victim to interest group competition.
Lobbying by the representatives of the software and information industries was
successful in persuading the Article 2 drafting committee at the NCCUSL annual
meeting in August 2001 to change its position and recommend a new scope
provision negotiated and drafted that day. As noted above, the new provision
survived a motion to delete, but a motion necessary to obtain NCCUSL approval
of the entire package failed. Subsequently, the drafting committee forged a new
compromise, one that left the original scope provision unchanged, but amended the
definition of goods in U.C.C. § 2-103 (formerly U.C.C. § 2-105) to exclude
information. This version was approved by NCCUSL at its annual meeting in
August 2002. By leaving "information" undefined, the compromise purports to
leave to the courts the task of defining the line of demarcation between goods and
computer information transactions.
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In 1987, the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code set out to resolve these and other questions under
the auspices of a study committee. The study committee concluded
that Article 2 was not an adequate legal framework for addressing the
many unique issues raised by software licensing transactions. In
1991, acting upon the report and recommendation of the study
committee, the ALI and NCCUSL appointed a drafting committee to
begin.work on a comprehensive revision of Article 2, that, among
other things, would bring within the scope of Article 2 the provisions
on lease transactions that were then embodied in Article 2A, and
would also include provisions to address the unique characteristics of
software licensing transactions. The Article 2 Drafting Committee
worked for several years on this "hub and spoke" scheme for
incorporating all relevant transactions within the Article 2 umbrella.
But the effort was abandoned when key insiders concluded that the
differences between the products, their markets and practices made
the draft unworkable." 7 The ALI and NCCUSL then decided to
return leases to its own statute (Article 2A) and also to draft a
separate U.C.C. Article 2B for computer information contracts.
Separate drafting committees were thus appointed for each ofArticle
2, Article 2A and Article 2B and the drafting work proceeded on
parallel, but separate, tracks.
The first public indication that the private legislative coalition that
had supported the U.C.C. project for fifty years was beginning to
unravel surfaced in 1999 when proposed Article 2B was brought
forward by the drafting committee for final approval by the ALl and
NCCUSL. The ALI declined to approve Article 2B on the ground
that the drafting process, dominated by the software and information
industry, had produced a "seller-friendly" statute. NCCUSL, on the
other hand, decided to go forward with the project on its own,
reissuing the statute as the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCITA). The controversy over UCITA centers on
the. provisions of the statute dealing with contract formation in
standardized retail transactions. UCITA endorses current market
practices in which consumers signify advance acceptance of
subsequently disclosed terms.' 28 Subsequently, UCITA has been
127. Speidel, View from the Trenches, supra note 5, at 612-13.
128. The subsequently disclosed terms typically have provisions by which sellers
or licensors seek to limit their warranty liability and/or limit the buyer/licensee's
remedies for "bugs" or defects in software or other "smart" goods. Thus, at bottom,
the issue has to do with the extension of Article 2 warranty liability to software and

computer information providers and the mechanisms by which that liability can be
shifted (in whole or in part). See Jean Braucher, Uniform ComputerInformation
TransactionsAct (UCITA): Objectionsfrom the ConsumerPerspective, 5 No. 6
GLCY Law 2 (2000); James C. McKay, Jr., UCITA andthe Consumer:A Response
to ProfessorBraucher,5 No. 8 GLCY Law 9 (2000); Michael L. Rustad, Making
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adopted in Virginia and Maryland, but has encountered stiff
opposition from consumer interests in other jurisdictions.' 29
The split between the ALI and NCCUSL broke into the open in
the summer of 1999 when revised Article 2 and 2A were brought
forward for final approval. Revised Articles 2 and 2A were approved
UCITA More Consumer-Friendly, 18 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 547
(1999).
129. In an effort to respond to some of these concerns, the NCCUSL Standby
Committee issued a report in December 2001 detailing recommendations
concerning proposed amendments to UCITA that it planned to make to NCCUSL
at its Summer 2002 meeting. On January 30, 2002 an ABA Working Group
appointed by the ABA Board of Governors filed a report on UCITA, concluding
that it would be desirable to have a uniform law that set forth legal rules governing
licensing in computer transactions. But the working group also raised a number of
critical concerns both with the alleged lack of clarity of UCITA's terms and with
the policy judgments implicit in specific provisions, particularly those governing
scope and contract formation in retail transactions. See American Bar Association
Working Group Report on the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(Jan. 31, 2002). According to the dissenting member of the working group, the
disagreements within the ABA are a reflection of interest group competition
between the computer information industry on the one hand and representatives of
large firm licensees (and their lawyers) on the other: "The key policy issue that
confronts the Board of Governors in reviewing the Working Group's report is
whether narrow parochial interest groups that have failed to win policy or political
arguments in the ... drafting process will have a second chance to defeat ... a
NCCUSL approved statute." See Minority Report of Donald Cohn at 6.
Contrast the current interest group clash over UCITA with the original
efforts by Llewellyn to enact Article 2. Interest group competition of this sort did
not emerge, as Llewellyn recognized, because "the same parties and the same types
of party can tomorrow be occupying each the other end of similar disputes." K.N.
Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback,52 Harv. L. Rev. 725-27 (1939). In short,
since parties to commercial sales transactions are both buyers and sellers, there is
no reason to believe that one group or class is distributionally disadvantaged over
the other. That symmetry of effects is clearly not present in the battle between the
large firm licensors of computer information and their licensees.
Thus, the UCITA project is a further example of the effects of interest
group competition in the private legislative process. The Schwartz/Scott model
would predict continuing deadlock within the three key private legislative
groups-the ABA, the ALl and NCCUSL-over the enactment of a statutory
scheme governing computer information transactions. Much as with the Article 2
revisions, the debate over UCITA centers on the question of the appropriate domain
of freedom of contract in mass market license transactions. In the words of
dissenting member Cohn:
UCITA is and has always been intended as a commercial statute. Some
interest groups have attempted to change UCITA into a national uniform
consumer protection statute. The problem ... is a desire on the part of
various interest groups to require UCITA to include mandatory, nonwaivable provisions to protect their constituents, even large companies
that do not need this type of protection. The underlying current in the
opposition to UCITA is a desire for more mandatory provisions and not
less. More restrictions on freedom of contract and not less.
Minority Report of Donald Cohn at 8-9.
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by the ALl in May 1999 but, after encountering severe opposition
from industry interests, the leadership of NCCUSL suddenly
withdrew the drafts from consideration during its annual meeting two
months later. 3 ' This action, in turn, prompted the Reporter and
Associate Reporter for the Revised Article 2 to resign.'
In an
attempt to patch the tattered alliance together, ALI and NCCUSL
agreed on a newly reconstituted drafting committee covering both
articles, which was directed to focus on "non-controversial," technical
amendments to the existing statute.'32 Two years later, the new
committee brought forward the Proposed 2001 Amendments to
Article 2, which were approved (subject to several minor
amendments) by the ALI in May 2001. -Despite the uncertainties
surrounding thejurisdiction ofArticle 2, UCITA, or the common law
over transactions in information products, especially "smart goods"
that contain and are often controlled by computer programs, the
drafting committee decided to retain Article 2's original, open-ended
scope provision."3
That decision was primarily a pragmatic
acceptance of the status quo since intense interest group competition
was able to block the more precise, bright-line alternatives suggested
by either side.
Following the ALl vote, the software and information interests
continued to lobby NCCUSL for changes in the scope provision.
Their interests were to prevent validation in the new Article 2 of
judicial decisions that applied (directly or by analogy) "buyerfriendly" provisions of Article 2 to transactions in information and,
concomitantly, to have the Article 2 amendments acknowledge the
existence and applicability of UCITA. 3 4 At the NCCUSL annual
meeting in August, the drafting committee agreed on new scope
language that, while not referring to UCITA, parallels to some extent
the structure and substance of the UCITA scope provision. Brought
to the floor, the new scope provision survived a motion to delete by
a vote of sixty to ninety-eight. NCCUSL also effectivelyreversed the.
130. There are differing explanations for the sudden decision by the NCCUSL
leadership to withdraw the July, 1999 draft. The Reporter ofthe Article 2 drafting
committee believes that the action followed a threat by the so called "strong" sellers
(i.e. General Electric and the Automobile Manufacturer's Association) to oppose
the draft, if approved, in every state legislature. See Speidel, View from the
Trenches, supra note 5, at 611, 617-18.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 615-17. As reported by the Director of the ALI to its members, the
drafting committee was asked "to preserve the substantive gains in the [earlier]
version while restoring some of the language of the original Article 2 with which
lawyers and business people are comfortable." Letter from Lance Liebman, ALl
Director, to the Members of the ALl (Sept. 17, 1999) (on file with author).
133. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (2000).
134. Liebman, Introduction,supranote 4, at 1.
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ALI floor amendments to the statute offrauds and liquidated damages
provisions. Finally, a motion to approve the new Article 2 failed by
a vote of fifty-three to eighty-nine,'35 an action subsequently
described as the "left joining the right to beat up on the middle." 36
In the months that followed, the drafting committee forged a new
compromise that amended the definition of "goods" to exclude
"information. '137
By leaving "information" undefined, the
compromise delegates to the courts the task of separating goods from
computer information transactions. This version ofthe Amendments
was approved by NCCUSL at its annual meeting in August 2002.
Thus, the deadlock over scope was broken but only by virtue of a
strategy that carefully preserves the status quo in the ongoing
competition over the regulation ofcomputer information transactions.
The open split between the ALI and NCCUSL is merely a
symptom of the intense interest group competition that has emerged
during the Article 2 revision process. Retail manufacturing interests
(the so-called "strong" sellers), opposed to provisions that extended
warranty liability for economic loss to remote sellers, were able
successfully to block the adoption of the initial revisions to Article 2.
In turn, consumer interests (including large firm licensees) opposed
to the "seller-friendly" provisions in the proposed Article 2B, were
able to separate the computer information article from the rest of the
U.C.C. project. From there the battleground moved to rival efforts to
either secure or block the further enactment ofUCITA. This included
the tug-of-war over efforts to acknowledge UCITA in the scope
provisions of the revised Article 2. Thus, even in the effort to bring
forward the seemingly uncontroversial Amendments to Article 2,
each side was able to block approval of the other's proposals but
unable to secure approval of its own. The competition among interest
groups continues to block significant revision of Article 2, supporting
the prediction that private legislatures are strongly biased toward the
status quo whenever their proposals encounter such competition. 3 '
It is unlikely that Article 2 will ever be revised so as to deal
directly with any of the unique problems presented by the new
technology. Whatever happens in the future, therefore, non-Code
legal regimes will be called upon to resolve the increasingly intense
normative debate over the domain offree contract in retail computer
135. Id at 2.
136. Email from Chris Hoving, Managing Editor to UCCLawl@lists.washlaw.edu (Aug. 14, 2001) [on file with author].
137. See Preliminary Comment to proposed U.C.C. §2-103: "the definition of
goods has been amended to exclude information not associated with goods.... For
example, the sale of "smart goods" such as an automobile is a transaction in goods.
...On the other hand, an architect's provision of architectural plans on a diskette
would not be a transaction in goods."
138. Schwartz & Scott, PoliticalEconomy, supra note 8, at 633-37.
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information transactions as well as to specify the default rules to fill
gaps in commercial information transactions. We are left with three
questions: First, what happened in the intervening fifty years to
change a reformer dominated process, with little interest group
involvement, to a process dominated by competing interest groups?
Second, why has the resulting deadlock generated such little interest
beyond the affected interest groups and the academic reformers who
are active participants in the private legislative process? Third,
assuming the causes of deadlock and indifference can be identified,
what adverse effects on contracting are the likely consequences?
B. Interest Group Competition over the Domain ofFree Contract
There are, no doubt, many reasons why the debate over how best
to regulate standardized contracting was framed as a "technical" or
"practical" problem in 1950, but emerged as a sharp clash over values
fifty years later. One of the salient facts, however, is that Llewellyn's
solution to the tension between the freedom to contract out from legal
defaults and the regulation of "unbalanced" transactions depended
heavily on his institutionalist perspective. Llewellyn saw groups,
rather than individuals, as the key unit ofanalysis. The question that
interested him was "how do groups work?" He found the answer to
this question in the group norms that were the source of the tailored
defaults ("working rules") that permit flexible adaptation within those
groups. At the same time, these norms were the means of regulating
the outlier behavior of "contract-dodgers and chiselers." Article 2
incorporates this institutionalist conception through its focus on the
trade usages and commercial practices of groups of merchants. In
that sense, the contemporary notion of interest groups-individuals
bound together not by what work they do but by their effort to secure
common political outcomes, was simply foreign to Llewellyn and the
social scientists who influenced him. As Allen Kamp puts it, "The
consumer group is a product of our consumption-driven,
individualistic society. It is hard to reconceptualize the Code to
include it."' 39
139. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought,supranote 51, at 347. The most

vivid illustration of this methodological divide has been the experience with the

doctrine of unconscionability. The unconscionability provision as it has come to
be applied by courts bears little relation to its original conception. Most courts have
adopted Llewellyn's two part test, but have applied the doctrine more narrowly than
he envisioned. See David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures,and Paternalism,74
Va. L. Rev. 519, 534-35 (1988) ("Despite the charter granted to the courts by the
Code's unconscionability provision, such decisions remain especially rare in the

realm ofcommercial and consumer sales."). Procedural unconscionability has been

most commonly found in standard form contracts where significant risks are shifted
from sellers to buyers through inconspicuous and/or obscure terms. In turn, courts
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Contemporary analysis has shifted to a focus on methodological
individualism. Neoclassical economics justifies default rules by
reference to the savings that they offer to bargainers who need not
specify an alternative allocation of risks and by the freedom of
idiosyncratic bargainers to opt out. Consumer advocates argue for
judicial regulation of standardized contracts on the grounds that
individual assent is absent. In both cases, therefore, autonomy
interests justify conflicting policy prescriptions: the "right" to
contract out on the one hand, and the "right" to dicker individually
over contract terms on the other. In a world that focuses on "rights,"
the normative objectives of filling gaps with efficient defaults and
regulating unbalanced bargains are fundamentally in conflict. It is
unsurprising, therefore, that a single statutory scheme can no longer
accommodate both objectives without stimulating value conflicts that
the private legislative process is ill suited to resolve. In sum,
Llewellyn's Article 2 assumes that there are "technical" resolutions
to contested normative questions. The private legislative process is
peculiarly ill equipped to deal with the regulation of consumer
transactions precisely because it lacks the capacity to accommodate
the underlying, competing values.
C. The "Corbinization"ofArticle 2 Default Rules and the Exit of
CommercialContracting
We can only speculate about why so few seem to care about the
deadlock in the Article 2 revision process. What we do know is that
the incorporation mechanism introduced by Llewellyn has not
functioned as he intended. Llewellyn intended the key instruction to
courts-focus on commercially reasonable merchant practices-as a
find such risk allocations substantively unconscionable if the risk in question

materializes. Viewed ex post, therefore, the two tests are effectively collapsed into
one. In effect, the unconscionability doctrine has become a straightforward
extension of the common law doctrine of fraudulent concealment, designed to
police the practice of "concealing" key terms in standardized agreements. The
lesson for sellers in mass market transactions, therefore, has been to use bold print,
clear language and other similar prophylactics to insulate important risk allocations

from subsequent attack. Insum, unconscionability has become an ex post litigation
strategy by which individual consumers can shift losses back to careless sellers. But

the unconscionability litigation has failed to generate any new legal rules that

redraw the boundaries of free contract inmass market transactions. See Melvin A.

Eisenberg, The BargainPrincipleandits Limits, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 752 (1982)
(". . the effect (if not the purpose) of this distinction [between procedural and
substantive unconscionability] . . . was to domesticate unconscionability by
accepting the concept insofar as it could be made harmonious with the bargain
principle (that is, insofar as it was 'procedural'), while rejecting its wider

implication that inappropriate cases the courts might review bargains for fairness
of terms.").
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direction to examine the relevant contracting environment and then

(presumably over time) to announce ex ante defaults that would apply

to particular populations of commercial parties. 4 '
But the
abandonment of the merchant tribunal doomed this effort from the

start. There is substantial evidence that courts have consistently
interpreted these statutory instructions not as directions to incorporate
commercial norms but rather as invitations to use context as a source
of subjective meaning-a determination of what the parties to the
particular dispute "must have meant" by their agreement.' 4 '
There are several reasons why this ex post perspective has been
the dominant interpretive strategy under the Code. I have argued
elsewhere that one reason was the (primarily instrumental) decision
' 42
by Llewellyn and his colleagues to create a "true commercial code."'
To the extent that a code is a preemptive, systematic and
comprehensive enactment of a field of law, it dictates a different

interpretive methodology than that of the common law or ordinary
commercial statutes. When a court in interpreting a code confronts a

gap in an incomplete contract, its duty is to use the processes of
analogy and- extrapolation to find a solution consistent with the
purposes and policy ofthe codifying law. In this way, the code itself

140. James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on
Llewellyn 'sGermanSourcesforthe Uniform Commercial Code, 97 Yale L.J. 156,
174 ("In Llewellyn's Romantic vocabulary, however, 'custom,' 'the law merchant'
and 'reasonableness' were not terms ofsubstantive law, but procedural directives,
indications to a court that it should refer its decision to lay specialists with a feel for
commercial law." Id.); Schwartz & Scott, Sales Law and the Contracting Process,
supra note 82, at 5("[T]he admonition to act in a commercially reasonable manner
functions ... as an empirical directive: to decide if the parties have acted in a
commercially reasonably manner, the decision maker must look to the marketplace
and observe relevant commercial behavior [to determine the legal norm].").
141. A LEXIS search for cases of the past ten years that invoke commercial
reasonableness in close conjunction with the mention of at least one Article 2
section returned 164 hits. A detailed examination of fifty-five cases randomly
selected from this base pool revealed only two cases where the court viewed the
commercial reasonableness question as requiring an inquiry into actual commercial
practice. In eighteen other cases, the court used an intuitive, subjective approach,
evaluating commercial reasonableness in terms ofwhether the particular contracting
parties acted reasonably under the contextual circumstances. The remaining cases
either dealt tangentially with commercial reasonableness or dealt principally with
commercial reasonableness under other sections of the Code. See Scott, Uniformity
Norm, supra note 19, at n.68.
142. Scott, Uniformity Norm, supra note 19, at 166, 170-72. The decision to
create a code was combined with the political instincts not to publicize the project
as a codification. William Hawkland, who served as Llewellyn's research assistant,
suggests that ifLlewellyn had publicized his intention to codify the commercial law,
the U.C.C. "probably would have died aborning." Hawkland, U.C.C. and Civil
Codes,supranote 71, at 231, 233 (1995).

1056

6LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 62

provides the best evidence ofwhat it means.' 43 In other words, a code
has a systematic method of filling gaps through a self-referential
process that divines the purposes of the enactment. In the U.C.C.,
this methodology is specified in section 1-102, which directs courts
to liberally construe and apply the specific provisions of the act "to
promote its underlying purposes and policies.""' In short, the Code
not only has the force of law but it is a source of law.'45 The net
effect of this institutional design is a highly contextualized
interpretive methodology, one that embeds the explicit terms of a
contract within the larger jurisprudential context ofthe Code as well
as within the specific commercial context.
In addition, subjective modes of interpretation were widely
accepted by many, ifnot most of the contract scholars who opined on
the meaning of the new statute. Following the lead ofArthur Corbin,
courts interpreting the Code were advised to use context evidence to
ascertain the mental states of the parties. To Corbin and other Code
commentators, therefore, context was an occasion'for recovering the
intention ofthe parties in litigation; not an occasion for promulgating
default rules derived from commercial practices.' 46 Courts thus
disregarded Llewellyn's intention that, in construing the meaning of
sales contracts, a court should focus on what the relevant usage of
trade took the contract to mean and not on what the parties mentally
intended. As Dennis Patterson has pointed out, Llewellyn's search for
ex ante default rules was closer to Williston than to the post- Code
adherents of subjective intention."'
Whatever the merits of such an ex post strategy in ensuring a just
resolution ofdisputes between contesting parties, the method carries
costs for future contracting parties who are less able to devise
"working rules" for predicting how contractual terms and language
will be interpreted in subsequent transactions.' 48 The irony, in the
143. Hawkland, U.C.C.and Civil Codes, supranote 71, at 233-35; William D.
Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. I11.
L. F. 291
(1962).
144. U.C.C. § 1-102 (1995).
145. Mitchell Franklin, On the LegalMethodofthe Uniform CommercialCode,
16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 330, 333 (1951).
146. See, e.g., 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 538 (1960).
147. Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary
Acceleration: OfLiewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68
Tex. L. Rev. 169, 189-90 (1989).
148. Interpretive questions are complex and this complexity has obscured the
scholarly debate over the choice between contextual and textual modes of
interpretation. To begin to sort the problems out, consider two polar interpretive
stances: (a) pure textualism: The interpreter considers only a contract's written text
when deciding what the contract directed; (b) pure contextualism: The interpreter
does not privilege the written words over any other relevant evidence ofthe parties'
intentions, such as the negotiations that preceded the contract, the parties practice

2002]

ROBERTE. SCOTT

1057

under it, and any customary meaning ofa contract term. Courts properly reject both
"pure" interpretive stances. Words derive meaning from the context in which they
are used, thereby justifying a court in rejecting pure textualism. On the other hand,
the writing often is the best evidence of the parties' intentions because parties intend
the writing to be the best evidence, thereby justifying a court in rejecting "pure"
contextualism. The interesting questions, therefore, concern where an interpreter
should locate herself on the continuum between pure textualism and pure
contextualism. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and The
Limits ofContractLaw (forthcoming 2002).
In answering this question, it is useful to identify three canonical cases
where courts will be called upon to interpret the meaning of incomplete contracts.
The first case involves the interpretation of contract terms that are linguistically
vague or ambiguous. When a single contract term has more than one possible
meaning, the same set of factual conditions may generate alternate sets of
prescribed consequences. Such ambiguity is normally unintended. Thus, in most
instances, had the possibility ofthe dispute-triggering conditions been pointed out
in advance, the parties could have reformulated the terms so as to remove the
ambiguity and would have preferred to so rectify the error. When unresolvable
controversies arise over the meaning of "ambiguous" contractual language, the
parties must resort to a third party interpreter. A classic example of this first
interpretive task is FrigalimentImporting Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F.
Supp 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ("The issue is, what is chicken?"). Here contextual
evidence is generally admissible on the sensible grounds that it produces greater
accuracy in ascertaining the parties intentions. There is a trade-off, however,
between accurate interpretation of the disputed contract and the promulgation of
interpretive rules (such as the plain meaning rule) designed to encourage costeffective precautions in contract drafting.
A second interpretive challenge arises when the parties dispute the meaning
of facially unambiguous express contract language that purports to opt out of a
state-created or customary default rule. Thus, for example, a seller may urge the
enforcement of a contract term that calls for the buyer to purchase 70,000 cubic
yards of cement. The contract further provides that "no conditions which are not
incorporated in this contract will be recognized." The buyer defends by claiming
that, customarily, parties in the trade understand such quantity terms as only
estimates subject to renegotiation. See Southern Concrete Services, Inc. v.
Mableton Contractors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1975). Here the risk is
that, unless the court privileges the written agreement by excluding the contextual
evidence, parties such as the buyer will be motivated to dispute the meaning of
perfectly communicative contract terms as a strategic response to a now disfavored
contract.
The third canonical case has not been well recognized by courts or
commentators. The contract may be incomplete because it is insufficiently "state
contingent," that is, there are a number of possible future states about which the
contract is silent. In this case, a court intent on admitting context evidence to
determine the parties actual intent will do damage to future contracting if it
completes the contract in a way that the parties themselves never would have agreed
to. Thus, for example, if a buyercannot observe or verify the value of a relevant
economic parameter, such as the seller's costs, the buyer will reject a contract that
conditions on that parameter because of the risk that the seller will behave
strategically. Here, a contextualist interpretive approach increases the risk of ex
post strategic behavior relative to a textualist approach. Thus, there is a trade-off
between the presumed benefits of greater accuracy in finding what the parties at bar
intended and the likelihood that parties in general will be induced by a court's

1058

8LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 62

case of a uniform code, is that the ex post method impairs genuine,
"substantive uniformity."
An interpretation is "substantively
uniform" when it is transparent to the litigating parties and
predictable to other parties. Uniform interpretation thus has both a
jurisdictional and a temporal dimension. One uniformity value is for
parties to know at the time they write contracts that their verifiable
obligations will be interpreted in the same manner by courts in
different jurisdictions. In addition, uniformity values are enhanced if
parties are certain that courts in any given jurisdiction will interpret
their verifiable obligations uniformly over time. If the state performs
this function inconsistently, the costs of contracting will rise.'49
Casual observation suggests that the risk of unpredictable
interpretation has increased for commercial parties under the Code.
Courts under the Code have interpreted the meaning of express terms
in a contract by looking to the commercial context to determine what
the words mean. While this may seem perfectly logical (the parties
negotiated the contract in a particular context, so courts should look
to that context to determine what the parties meant by the words they
used), this interpretive approach injects a bias into the process.
Giving the commercial context interpretive priority subverts the
efforts of those commercial parties who wish to opt out of the
relevant commercial context.' 0 Moreover, these uncertainty and
error costs are not the sole effects of interpretation bias under the
Code. An ex post or subjective strategy of interpretation also
undermines Llewellyn's original goal of increasing the supply of
legally sanctioned default terms that subsequent parties could use in
formulating their agreements.
Uncertainty is a deadweight cost and contracting parties have
substantial incentives to reduce these contracting costs. Whether
causally linked or not, the dominance of ex post interpretation has
coincided with the exit from the Code by important classes of
commercial parties. Exit has taken several different forms.
Commercial trade associations are able to solve the collective action
problems that otherwise impede contractual innovation.' 5 ' They have
interpretive rules to shift to less efficient contracts. Id.
149.

Scott, Uniformity Norm, supranote 19, at 152.

150. Id. at 164. See, e.g., Brunswick Box Co. v. Coutinho, Caro & Co., 617
F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1980); Steuber Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 646 F.2d. 1093 (5th Cir.
1981); Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v.Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d. 772 (9th Cir. 1981);
Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v.Royster, 451 F.2d. 3 (4th Cir. 1971); Modine Mfg. Co.
v.North E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 503 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
151. A transition to new default terms and different interpretive rules requires
parties to first develop and then groups of contractors to coordinate their joint
adoption of a standard formulation ofthe novel terms. So long as parties must bear
the full costs ofdeveloping novel contract terms but are incapable of capturing the
full benefits oftheir innovative efforts, novel terms will be under-produced. Goetz
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devised substitute sets of substantive rules for intragroup transactions
that are made subject to binding arbitration. The trade rules
governing the contracts between members of the National Grain and
Feed Association, 52 the American Cotton Shippers Association and
the American Textile Manufacturers Institute, 53 and many other trade
associations,' 54 create private legal systems for resolving contract
disputes among themselves. These rules substitute clear, bright-line
rules and objective modes of interpretation in place of the Code's
vague rules and subjective, contextualized approach to
interpretation.155 For whatever reason, these groups evidence a
preference for acontextual (and thus more certain) modes of
interpretation. In so doing, they decline to judicialize the more
flexible relational norms that control strategic behavior in their
ongoing relationships.' 56
Parties to inter-industry contracts generally cannot (and do not)
opt out of the Code entirely. But they can and do opt out of the
Code's ill-fitting default rules and its preference for highly
contextualized interpretation. Here the strategy is to develop standard
terms that create customized risk allocations for commonly arising
risks, such as the risk of product defects. There are a number of
common examples ofthese customized terms. The standard "repair
and replacement" clause replaces the Code's warranty rules as well
as the rules governing rejection and cure. This standard provision
governs most commercial equipment sales today.' Exculpatory or
& Scott, Expanded Choice, supra note 96, at 283-86.
152. Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 103, at 1772-77.
153. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation through Rules, Norms and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001).
154. A number ofother trade associations have codified trade rules that govern
intra-industry contracts and that are subject to arbitration under trade-specified rules
of interpretation. See, e.g., American Fats and Oils Association, American Tin
Trade Association, Association ofFood Industries, Diamond Dealers Club, General
Arbitration Council of the Textile and Apparel Industries (Worth Street Rules),
National Hay Association, North American Lumber Association, Rubber Trade
Association, Tea Association of the USA. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra
note 103, at 1772-77 n.134.
155. In enforcing arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act, the
Supreme Court has held that arbitration procedures, including the principles
governing the interpretation of the agreement, may be specified by the agreement
itself. See Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr., 489 U.S. 468, 479, 109 S. Ct. 1248,
1256 (1989). ("Just as [parties] may limit by contract the issues which they will
arbitrate, so too may they specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration
will be conducted." Id. (citations omitted)).
156. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 103, at 1775-82.
157. In the place of Code warranties and the rules for rejection, revocation, cure,
etc., parties who trade in hard goods, most especially in sales of equipment,
substitute standardized "repair and replacement" clauses. Such clauses purport to
divide quality risks between buyer and seller and to displace the binary default rules
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force majeure clauses replace Code provisions governing
performance and excuse.'58 Finally, the standard "contractual
insecurity" clause displaces Code rules governing insecurity and
anticipatory repudiation.'59 In each case, there is growing anecdotal
evidence that inconsistent judicial interpretations of these standard
terms under the Code regime of subjective interpretation has
stimulated the substitution of compulsory arbitration to resolve
disputes over liability under these customized clauses.
CONCLUSION

There are no reliable measures ofthe extent to which commercial
parties have opted out of the Code, either in whole or in part. But
casual observation points to an hypothesis: Article 2 has failed to
provide many commercial parties with reliable (i.e., uniform) rules
that reduce contracting costs. The dominance of subjective modes of
interpretation imposes uncertainty costs without providing the
corresponding benefits ofincorporation. Some classes ofcommercial
contractors have exited entirely; others have opted out of particular
portions of the statute. In any case, the upshot is a statute that is less
relevant to many (if not most) commercial parties. Commercial
interests have left the field to mass market transactions and to the
resulting clashes over the legal regulation of form contracting in these
markets.
Does any of this matter to anyone other than those whose
professional expertise involves advising others about the meaning of
governing revocation of acceptance and cure. See Schwartz & Scott, Sales Law and
the Contracting Process, supra note 82, at 204-09. One of the reasons that may
have contributed to the increase in agreements to arbitrate disputes under the
standard clause are the inconsistent interpretations of the repair and replacement
clause in different jurisdictions. Compare, e.g., Myrtle Beach Pipeline Corp. v.
Emerson Elec. Co., 843 F. Supp. 1027 (D.S.C. 1993) with Earl M. Jorgensen Co.
v. Mark Constr., Inc., 540 P.2d 978 (Haw. 1975) andInternational Fin. Serv., Inc.
v. Franz, 23 U.C.C. Rep.2d 1078 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) aff'd in part,rev'd inpart
534 N.W.2d 261, 26 U.C.C. Rep.2d 1137 with Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash
Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980).
158. See, e.g., a standard "excusable delay" clause: "Seller shall not be
responsible nor deemed to be in default on account of delays in performance...
due to causes beyond Seller's control and not occasioned by its fault or negligence,
including but not limited to ... any act of government, governmental priorities,
allocation regulations or orders affecting materials, equipment.., failure of vendors
(due to cause similar to those within the scope of this clause) to perform their
contracts. . . , provided such cause is beyond Seller's control."
159. See, e.g., Northwest Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Continental Forest Prod., Inc.,
495 P.2d 744, 749 (1972) (standard insecurity clause in industrial association's
"Terms and Conditions of Quotation and Sale" construed as an enforceable
variation of U.C.C. § 2-609 by agreement of the parties).
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the Code? The major cost of wholesale opting out is the loss ofthe
social benefits that derive from judicial resolution of disputed
contracts. Commercial arbitration decisions remain unpublished for
the most part. This means that the positive externalities that result
from authoritative resolution ofdisputed contracts are sacrificed. The
state facilitates the contracting process to the extent that courts in the
process of interpretation create standardized (or uniform) terms that
future parties can use in signaling their intentions. These
standardized signals are developed in two ways. The first is through
gap filling, the specification of default rules that complete incomplete
contracts. The second method of standardization occurs when courts
interpret authoritatively the meaning of invocationsor standard form
terms and clauses that parties frequently use in writing contracts. In
either case, the primary role of the state in regulating incomplete
contracts is the standardization of the meaning and jurisdiction of the
state-supplied defaults and the privately provided invocations from
which parties can customize their contracts. Substituting unpublished
arbitration decisions for published judicial opinions thus represents
a real social cost. In this sense, then, Article 2 threatens to become a
uniform statute that provides the parties who rely on it few, if any, of
the benefits that inhere in uniformity.
These costs might be offset by the social benefits inherent in a
normatively acceptable regime for regulating standard form
contracting or computer information transactions. But this task is one
that recent evidence shows the Code is peculiarly incapable of
performing. Contrast, for example, the current interest group clash
over UCITA with the original efforts by Llewellyn to enact Article 2.
Interest group competition of that sort did not emerge, as Llewellyn
recognized, because "the same parties and the same types ofparty can
tomorrow be occupying each the other end ofsimilar disputes."' 60 In
short, since parties to commercial sales transactions are both buyers
and sellers, there is no reason to believe that one group or class is
distributionally disadvantaged over the other. That symmetry of
effects is clearly not present in the battle between the large firm
licensors of computer information and their licensees (whether the
licensees are large firms or individual consumers).
In sum, uniformity worked when there was symmetry (when
today's buyer might be tomorrow's seller) and Article 2 has always
had great success in that subpart of contract law. Indeed many ofthe
vague provisions that remain in the original Article 2 coincide with
distributional asymmetries, and one can surmise that Llewellyn
avoided interest group competition by drafting vague rules in just
160. K. N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback,52 Harv. L. Rev. 725-27
(1939).
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those instances. But where the distributional effects were symmetric,
the evidence suggests that Llewellyn worked with more effort and
effect to find the best possible default rule, unless there was real
reason to think judges could do better on the ground in the future.
Viewed from that perspective, the extension of the Code to
Article 2A (Leases) was a big step for the ALl and NCCUSL because
lease transactions are not entirely symmetrical. On the other hand
there likely were significant gains to uniformity in enacting 2A, and,
in any event, even if there were political deals, they were not worth
much because they could subsequently be priced in the lease contract.
In other words, if lessors got better rules in Article 2A than they
would obtain in freely dickered, customized contracts, then the Coderegulated contract would result in giving lessors slightly worse
prices.' 6 ' But the same cannot be said for many consumer
transactions and perhaps not for computer information contracts
under proposed Article 2B. On this view, the breakdown occurred
where you might expect it, where the distributional
62 effects were
1
uncertain.
were
effects
pricing
the
and
asymmetric
One normative implication of the deadlock over the revisions to
Article 2, therefore, is that the ALl and NCCUSL should not propose
uniform rules for transactions where the distributional effects are
asymmetric and prices are unlikely to adjust efficiently so as to
compensate for a single group's victory in the legislative process.
These issues are better resolved in the ordinary political process
where competing value claims can be accommodated more
effectively. When it was first enacted, Article 2 created social value
by removing the detritus of common law notions of title from sales
law. It has served us continuously, if not completely well, for fifty
years. But the methodological premises which formed the foundation
of the distributional judgments in the statute are no longer widely
shared. A statute created to incorporate the group ideology of
institutionalism is ill-suited as a template for regulation in an era
whose ideology is self-consciously individualistic. As Grant Gilmore
161. The argument is slightly different in those cases, such as Articles 3, 4 and
9 where the distributional effects are both asymmetric and unevenly spread between
a few concentrated winners and many diffused losers. In those cases, there is a
respectable argument that, even if the political deals are on average fully priced out
in the resulting contracts, the costs are to high because the losers do not adjust
prices in individual transactions that favor the winners. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk
& Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy, 105 Yale L.J. 857 (1996).
162. In this latter case, the argument is that the market will price inefficiently

because of market imperfections such as monopoly power or asymmetric
information. Moreover, any distributional effects of the statute are likely to be
redistribute wealth from the relatively poor and uninformed to the rich and
sophisticated. Robert E. Scott, The Truth About SecuredFinancing,82 Cornell L.
Rev. 1436 (1997).
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famously said, Karl Llewellyn was "always willing-indeed
eager-to rethink his own earlier formulations.... To Llewellyn the
ultimate absurdity would have been not to' be
63 able to improve on what
...[he] had written [fifty] years earlier."'

163. Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and The Uniform
Commercial Code: Confessions ofa Repentant Draftsman, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 605,
606(1981).

